Electronic Library of Scientific Literature

FILOZOFIA

Volume 51 / No. 5 / 1996

• Moral Responsibility and Ethical Conception
• The Interpretation Death and after Death Life in Classical Chinese Philosophy
• Intensionality and Intentional States
• Apriority and Necessity in Kripke’s Work Naming Necessity

MORALNA ZODPOVEDNOST A ETICKA KONCEPCIA H. JONASA

Moral Responsibility and Ethical Conception.

VASIL GLUCHMAN, Katedra filozofie FF UPJS, Presov
WOJTEK SZTOMBKA, Katedra etiky, Univerzita Lodz, Polsko

The autors focuse on the problem of moral responsibility in H. Jonas’ ethics of social consequences. While by Jonas the attention is paid mainly to global moral responsibility, in the consequentialist ethics the individual, and social levels of moral responsibility of moral subject are intertwinned.
FILOZOFIA 51, 1996, No 5, p. 287

OTAZKA SMRTI A INTERPRETACIA POSMRTNEHO ZIVOTA V KLASICKEJ CINSKEJ FILOZOFII

The Interpretation Death and after Death Life in Classical Chinese Philosophy.

MARINA CARNOGURSKA, Kabinet orientalistiky SAV, Bratislava

The paper is a comparative study: it compares the traditional European ideas based on Christian conception of death and after death life with the classical oriental philosophical conceptions and worldviews. The Christian conception is compared with Indian and Chinese nonsubstantial ontological theories as „nirvana“, i.e. blowing out into a stream of formless energy (“shunia“), Emptiness, or into an endless stream of pure energy (Te) of the Way of Tao , which is the ground of bipolar-dialectical cyclical motion of the Universe, and according to oriental conceptions continually recreated and realized.
FILOZOFIA 51, 1996, No 5, p. 296

INTENZIONALITA A INTENCIONALNE STAVY

Intensionality and Intentional States.

PETER STACH, posluchac 5. rocnika Katedry filozofie a dejin filozofie, FFUK, Bratislava

The aim of the paper is to show one part of Searle’s conception of intentionality in its relationship to the problem of intensionality. A short characteristics of intensionality is given, followed by the outline of Searle’s concept of intentionality and intentional states, leaving out the problems of intensionality concerning modal contexts. Finally, the autor makes an attempt to show how in Searle’s opinion intentionality solves the problems of intensionality, and to compare his solution with the analysis of G. Frege and P. Tichy.
FILOZOFIA 51, 1996, No 5, p. 309

CHAPANIE APRIORNEHO A NEVYHNUTNEHO V KRIPKEHO PRACI POMENOVANIE A NEVYHNUTNOST

Apriority and Necessity in Kripke’s Work Naming Necessity.

EUGEN ANDREANSKY, posluchac 5. rocnika FF UPJS, Kosice

The paper delas with the critique of Kant’s conception of the relation between apriority and necessity given by S. Kripke in his work Naming and Necessity. A short retrospective outline of the Kantian, resp. traditional interpretation of the above metioned realtion is offered, followed by the explication of Kripke’s argumentation against this conception. In the last part Tichý’s criticism of Kripke’s argumentation is presented.
FILOZOFIA 51, 1996, No 5, p. 319