Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press
Vol. XII / No 2 / 2003
ŠTÚDIE, ANALÝZY - STUDIES, ANALYSIS
German-Russian Relations: High Expectations, Adequate Outcomes?
Nemecko-ruské vzťahy: veľké očakávania, adekvátne výsledky?Odmietanie vojny proti Iraku ako katalyzátor kontinuity a premien nemeckej zahraničnej politiky
The Refusal of the War against Iraq as a Catalyzer of Continuity and Changes of the German Foreign Policy39 Jozef Hudec
Stručný náčrt základov islamského fundamentalizmu
Brief Description of the Main Characteristics of the Islamic FundamentalismZahraničná politika USA voči strednej Európe v rokoch 1989 – 1994
U.S. Foreign Policy towards Central Europe in 1989 – 1994
ÚVAHY, ROZPRAVY, ROZHOVORY - REFLECTIONS, TRANSACTIONS, INTERVIEWS
79 Wilma Jober
Nemecko a štáty Visegrádskej štvorky
Germany and the Visegrad Four CountriesFrancúzsko-nemecké vzťahy: bilancia a perspektívy
French-German Relations: Evaluation and Prospects108 Marianna Oravcová
Slovensko-nemecké vzťahy v kontexte nemeckej zahraničnej politiky
Slovak-German Relations in the Context of the German Foreign Policy
DOKUMENTY A PRAMENE
121 Pavol Lukáč
K memorandu Richarda Coudenhove-Kalergiho Freiheit oder Einheit (Sloboda alebo jednota)
124 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
Sloboda alebo jednota – Memorandum k nemeckej otázke
RECENZIE, SPRÁVY
143 Peter Juza
Alimov, R. a kol.: Centrálna Ázia: geoekonomika, geopolitika, bezpečnosť
Markaziy Osiyo: geoiqtisod, geosyosat, havfsizlik. Šark, Taškent 2002, 208 strán148 Pavol Lukáč
Federalistické koncepcie v stredovýchodnej Európe v 20. storočí
organizátori: Inštitút stredovýchodnej Európy v Lubline, Herder Institut v Marburgu, Poľský výbor UNESCO
Nemecko-ruské vzťahy: veľké očakávania, adekvátne výsledky?
Iris Kempe
Autorka príspevku sa zaoberá rusko-nemeckými vzťahmi z dvoch
rozličných pohľadov: vzťahov Ruskej federácie s Európskou úniou
(EÚ) a bilaterálnou agendou zahrňujúcou nemecké politické,
ekonomické a sociálne záujmy.
Európska agenda nemecko-ruských vzťahov
EÚ, tak ako aj Nemecko samotné, si je vedomá dôležitosťou bezpečnostnej
spolupráce s Ruskou federáciou, a aj preto doposiaľ každé
zasadnutie Rady Rusko-EÚ (EU-Russia Council) bolo ukončené spoločným
vyhlásením, počínajúc Spoločnou stratégiou (Common Strategy) v rámci
Spoločnej zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej politiky EÚ uplatňovanej
voči Rusku. Aj napriek očakávaniam je však praktický výsledok
bezpečnostnej spolupráce limitovaný, a to najmä z dvoch dôvodov:
Stratégia bola vypracovaná v období napätých vzťahov medzi
Ruskom a EÚ v dôsledku krízy v Kosove, keď Rusko
odvolalo svojich zástupcov zo Spoločného Výboru NATO-Rusko. V dôsledku
týchto udalostí bolo len málo pravdepodobné, že by Stratégia bola
prijatá počas nemeckého predsedníctva, najmä kvôli účasti väčšiny
štátov EÚ v konflikte. Aj napriek tomu však Stratégia bola
prijatá počas nemeckého predsedníctva. Po druhé, bola výsledkom
vnútorných rozhodovacích procesov v EÚ. Najdôležitejším
prvkom, ktorý odlišuje Stratégiu od ostatných dokumentov, ako napríklad
Zmluva o partnerstve a spolupráci, je mechanizmus
kvalifikovanej väčšiny prijatej v Amsterdamskej zmluve. V tejto
súvislosti bola Stratégia vytvorená ako mechanizmus spoločnej bezpečnostnej
a obranej politiky. Ako odpoveď na dokumenty EÚ prijala ruská
strana Strednodobú stratégiu rozvoja vzťahov medzi Ruskou federáciou
a EÚ.
Okrem uvedených dokumentov sa obe strany dohodli na pravidelných špecifických
konzultáciách o bezpečnostných a obranných otázkach, ako
aj na strategickom dialógu týkajúceho sa bezpečnostných výziev.
Navyše, v dôsledku teroristických útokov zo septembra 2001, bol
tento prístup prehĺbený Spoločným vyhlásením o medzinárodnom
terorizme (Joint Statement on International Terrorism) a Spoločnou
deklaráciou širšieho dialógu a spolupráce v politických
a bezpečnostných otázkach (Joint Declaration on Increasing
Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters), ktoré boli
prijaté v Bruseli v októbri 2001.
Bohužiaľ, spolupráca medzi oboma stranami sa nerozvíjala na požadovanej
úrovni, a to nie kvôli nedostatku deklarácií alebo potrebnej
politickej vôle, ale kvôli nejednotnosti členov EÚ, ako dokázala aj
iracká kríza.
Hlavným cieľom politiky voči novým susedom je zabrániť vytvoreniu
nových deliacich čiar medzi budúcimi členskými štátmi a ich
východnými susedmi. Prvým iniciátorom dialógu o priamych
susedských vzťahoch medzi rozšírenou EÚ a Ruskou federáciou,
ktorý začal už v roku 1998, bolo mníchovské Center for Applied
Policy Research. V novembri 2002 vypracovala Európska rada
politiku voči novým susedom, ktorej hlavnými bodmi sú silnejúca
spolupráca s budúcimi susedskými štátmi, zvýšená pozornosť
na regionálne špecifiká a rozširovanie cezhraničnej spolupráce.
Pravdepodobne najideálnejším scenárom budúcich dobrých susedských
vzťahov budú bilaterálne zmluvy a dohody medzi krajinami EÚ a budúcimi
susednými štátmi, ktoré by mali obsahovať aj všetky štyri slobody
(voľný pohyb osôb, tovarov, služieb a kapitálu).
Súčasná politika EÚ voči susedným štátom predstavuje, aj napriek
kritike, dôležitý krok vpred k posilneniu vplyvu EÚ za svojimi
hranicami. Na druhej strane táto politika neponúka stratégiu pre EÚ
ako európskeho hráča so spoločným bezpečnostným rámcom. Iracká
kríza nepoukázala len na divergencie vo vnútri EÚ, ale aj na dôležitosť
Ruska ako opory a potenciálneho partnera EÚ v oblasti bezpečnostnej
spolupráce. V tomto kontexte plní Rusko dve funkcie: susedný štát
a globálny hráč.
Od roku 2000 dominuje vzťahom Rusko-EÚ otázka Kaliningradu. Najdôležitejšou
otázkou je, či Kaliningrad má byť predsunutou vojenskou základňou
Ruska alebo jeho bránou do Európy.
Na začiatku diskusie o Kaliningrade prejavovali európske elity
len málo vôle urobiť akúkoľvek výnimku zo schengenského acquis
okrem niektorých technických ústupkov a finančnej podpory pre
zavedenie vízových pravidiel vyplývajúcich z tranzitných problémov
občanov Kaliningradu. V máji 2002, keď Rada Rusko-EÚ začala hľadať
technické riešenie, problém sa stával zložitejším. Aby sa
pripravila cesta pre rozšírenie EÚ, Únii neostávalo nič iné, len
počas summitu Rusko-EÚ v Bruseli v novembri 2002 pristúpiť
na určité kompromisy. V spoločnom vyhlásení sa obe strany
rozhodli pre zavedenie „zjednodušených tranzitných dokumentov“
pre pozemný transport ruských obyvateľov medzi Kaliningradom a ostatnými
časťami Ruska. Ďalšie detaily sa musia dohodnúť trilaterálne pred
zavedením víz 1. 6. 2003.
Na prvý pohľad sa zdá, že technické vyriešenie problému je výsledkom
ruských záujmov a európskeho kompromisu. Na druhej strane však
treba zvážiť limitovanú udržateľnosť tohto riešenia, ktorá síce
rieši otázku víz, ale neznižuje ekonomickú a sociálnu slabinu
daného regiónu.
Bilaterálna agenda nemecko-ruských vzťahov
Nemecko-ruské vzťahy sú založené na troch pilieroch: politické
vzťahy, sociálne kontakty a ekonomický dialóg.
Politické vzťahy na najvyššej úrovni vybudované Jeľcinom a Kohlom
boli po menších problémoch opäť počas vlád Putina a Schrödera
revitalizované. V júni 2000 sa obaja predsedovia vlád dohodli na
pravidelných konzultáciách na najvyššej úrovni. Prvé stretnutie
sa uskutočnilo v apríli 2001 v Petrohrade a malo
charakter výmeny názorov a hľadania riešení na konkrétne
problémy. Stretnutie bolo zakončené podpisom dvoch zmlúv. Druhé
stretnutie sa uskutočnilo v apríli 2002 vo Weimare, na ktorom
ruská strana súhlasila s vyplatením 500 mil. eur nemeckej vláde,
zatiaľ čo nemecká vláda podporí obchodné vzťahy 1 mld. v Hermes
bondoch.
Po septembri 2001 sa obe strany zhodli na potrebe spolupráce v oblasti
bezpečnosti a boja proti medzinárodnému terorizmu. Obzvlášť
zdôrazňovali situáciu na Blízkom východe.
Po troch rokoch vzťahov vedených Putinom a Schröderom možno
pozorovať kontinuitu špecifického politického partnerstva. Okrem
dobre zavedeného inštitucionálneho rámca na najvyššej úrovni
Putin so Schröderom pokračovali aj v rozvíjaní osobných vzťahov,
ad hoc stretnutiach a operatívnych rozhodnutiach.
Kvôli asymetrickosti vzťahov, spôsobenej vnútornými problémami v Rusku,
Rusko je stále zložitým partnerom pre Nemecko, ale rovnako môže byť
hnacou silou silnejúcej európskej obrannej a bezpečnostnej
spolupráce.
Druhým pilierom je sociálna oblasť. Vedená myšlienkou nového
charakteru vzťahov s Ruskom nemecká vláda sa rozhodla pre širší
rámec, zameraný na vzťahy zdola a podporu ruskej občianskej
spoločnosti. Keď však Putin so Schröderom iniciovali dialóg o občianskej
spoločnosti, bola to skôr aktivita nemeckej vlády. Schröder uplatnil
koncept Königwinterských rozhovorov iniciovaných po druhej svetovej
vojne na zmierenie nemecko-britských vzťahov.
Od prvého stretnutia, týkajúceho sa uvedenej oblasti, sa uskutočnili
tri ďalšie, na ktorých sa zúčastnilo 50 účastníkov z každej
strany. Sú organizované v šiestich pracovných skupinách, ktoré
sa zaoberajú medzinárodnou bezpečnosťou, úlohou občianskej spoločnosti
v modernom štáte, kultúrou a pod. Na rozdiel od Königwinterských
rozhovorov sú rozhovory v Petrohrade organizované dvoma prípravnými
výbormi. Obe strany zriaďujú rady asi s 15 členmi, menovanými
vládami.
Petrohradský dialóg poskytuje dodatočnú platformu pre tvarovanie vzájomného
porozumenia, ale aj tak sa mu zatiaľ nepodarilo prekonať opačné
ciele oboch strán.
Treba spomenúť početné iniciatívy Nemecka v sociálnej oblasti
v Rusku, napr. nemecko-ruské fórum, nemecké nadácie sídliace v Rusku,
ako aj tucty partnerstiev regiónov. Aj keď sa rusko-nemecké iniciatívy
zdajú byť pôsobivé, trpia určitou asymetriou; najmä kvôli finančným
rozdielom je väčšina projektov „západných“.
Tretím pilierom je ekonomická spolupráca. Od roku 1997 je Nemecko
najväčším obchodným partnerom Ruska. V roku 2001 smerovalo do
Nemecka 9,2 % celkového exportu Ruska a 13,8 % importov do Ruska
bolo z Nemecka. Naproti tomu Rusko je až 14. najväčším obchodným
partnerom Nemecka. Obchodné vzťahy sú rozdielne nielen po stránke
kvantitatívnej, ale aj kvalitatívnej. Kým hlavnými obchodnými
artiklami Nemecka sú tovary, Rusko sa sústreďuje na obchod so
surovinami a polotovarmi.
Nemecká vláda sa snaží podporovať transformačné procesy v Rusku
a podporuje integráciu Ruska do západných ekonomických štruktúr,
ponúka strategické smernice pre ekonomickú spoluprácu a hľadá
riešenia dlhových problémov Ruska. Jedným z nástrojov nemeckej
vlády na zvýšenie exportov do Ruska sú štátom garantované úvery
pokrývajúce obchodné a politické riziká spojené s transformačnými
procesmi v Rusku. Okrem toho v rámci Európskeho programu
technickej podpory spustila nemecká vláda program TRANSFORM, prostredníctvom
ktorého bolo v roku 2002 vyčlenených 200 mil. eur na transformačné
procesy v Rusku, zdôrazňujúc vládne konzultácie, konzultácie
v rámci finančného a bankového sektora a podporu súkromného
podnikania s dôrazom na program školení pre manažérov.
Hlavným politickým cieľom nemeckej vlády je záujem o rozvoj
strategického hospodárskeho a transformačného partnerstva s budúcim
moderným Ruskom, ktoré ponúka nielen prírodné zdroje, ale aj
rozsiahly trh. Záujem Putinovej administratívy je zameraný na
posilnenie vstupu na medzinárodné kapitálové trhy, rast priamych
zahraničných investícií a integráciu Ruska do najdôležitejších
svetových ekonomických organizácií, najmä WTO, ale aj na budovanie
spoločného európskeho ekonomického priestoru.
The Refusal of the War against Iraq as a Catalyzer of Continuity and Changes of the German Foreign Policy
Marianna Oravcová
“Continuity is a key term of the German foreign policy,
multilateralism its method”, W. von Bredow characterises the period
from the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany until the German
unification and the beginning of the 90’s. The German foreign policy
kept the tradition of the cardinal multilateralism since the period of
the Adenauer’s government. It was based on two reliable pillars –
strong position in Europe and strong Trans Atlantic relations. The
continuity was also a kind of respond of the German foreign policy
to the worries stemming from the possible renewal of the idea of
supremacy of Europe, which were associated with German unification in
the period of 1989 – 1990 when Germany gained its own sovereignty.
In the 90’s, the politicians as well as the political theorists
advocated the opinion of the foreign policy corresponding with the
significance of self-confidence of the unified Germany as a middle-sized
country.
The German interest in the position of a permanent member in the UN
Security Council since 1992/93 willing to take over more responsibility
in the international community, which in fact means to abandon the
policy of self-repression (Selbstbeschränkung), is only one of the
examples of maintaining continuity and multilateralism regardless the
nature of German government. The process of foreign policy emancipation
was strongly manifested in the field of security policy. The changes
were indicated by three steps: the resolution of the Constitutional
Court from 1994 on constitutional conditions of Bundeswehr employment
out of area; the red – green coalition’s decision to participate in
the military intervention against Yugoslavia within NATO even without
the UN SC approval; and the government coalition’s decision not to
participate in military operations against Iraq.
Concerning the German foreign policy bases, the decision not to
participate in war against Iraq means the abandonment of present balance
based on the two pillars. Not only the abandonment of one pillar, but
also polarisation of the second one – European unity. In both cases
the decision is naturally accompanied by the intensive diplomatic
activities aimed at the mitigation of the caused damages. In case of the
relations to the USA the opinions on the nature of discrepancy –
primarily structural or personal differ. As far as the differences among
EU countries are concerned, the opinions are connected with the EU
enlargement and its structural reform. In both cases the government’s
decisions are accepted by the German public.
Prospectively, German policy is interested in maintaining the both
pillars. The necessity of Trans Atlantic co-operation and the need for
good bilateral relations with the USA were not questioned by any
political party. Similarly, all the German politicians supported the
victory of the allied powers in Iraq. The opposition “strongly
supported USA”. The government evaluated the different opinions on war
as a clear difference in opinions between the governments, not as
the deep discrepancy between both countries. The basis of the German –
USA relations was not considered as jeopardised. And similarly the
analysts who considered the military intervention against Iraq neither
legitimate nor necessary (as they did not perceive the Iraqi regime as a direct
threat, reasoning the pre-emptive war) shared the same opinion, i. e.
“the USA must not lose the war”.
The whole period of German – USA cool relations was accompanied by
discussion on the political scene, as well as in German society. On one
hand, the debate included the appreciation of the historic role of the
USA as a European stabilising power, emphasising the indebtedness,
thank and valued fellowship with the USA mainly for the period of 1945
– 1990. On the other hand, the criticism of Bush administration’s
exercise of power for the period 2001 – 2002 concerning the paradigm
of US foreign policy strategy caused by the terrorist attacks from the
September 11, for which Europe and Germany had no answer.
Therefore, in the period before the military intervention, German
analysts attempted to offer an objective view and proposal for some
steps for Schröder’s Government. They pointed out power difference
between the USA and the other countries including Germany which should
be respected as a starting point for the analysis. The consequence
of this difference is that the USA can act as the only power, which lost
significant counterbalance after the Cold War period. Besides the new
foreign policy strategy, this new role of the USA requires to search for
own strategies of adaptation and
co-operation in Europe and Germany. The USA are no longer
“well-disposed hegemony” setting their own self-repression,
preferring multilateral institutions and mechanisms, which enabled other
participating countries to promote their own interests and viewpoints.
The foreign policy debates in Germany stem from constitutional
viewpoints as their relevant basis. The reason for this is the fact that
the German Constitution forces the German foreign policy to take
initiative in the direction of strengthening the UN, co-operation in EU
formation and the development of the friendly Trans Atlantic relations.
The constitutionality demands to follow the way of “co-operative
sovereignty” (P. Kirchhof).
For Germany, the lesson from Iraqi crisis, which brought certain
discrepancies in Trans Atlantic and European relations, basically is a return
to its foreign policy bases: to continuity given by the reliability of
both pillars – European and Trans Atlantic. The problem is that the
restoration is required mainly by their security policy dimension –
Trans Atlantic security policy as well as Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP). Summit, held in Brussels on April 29, 2003, showed that
the abovementioned aims as well as the steps to achieve them are of a
controversial nature.
By searching its substantiation and anchor in CFSP and CESDP which will
provide the dimension of flexibility, the German foreign policy
meanwhile continues in the trend of changes that started at the
beginning of the 90’s. Its special role is to remove the tension
accumulated in German – USA relations which gave rise to previously
established inner “asymmetric interdependence”. Who can take over
this task in Germany and in what period? Will the present Government
manage this task or is it the one waiting for the potential change of
government after the elections in 2006?
The differences between the coalition and the opposition in the issue of
the war against Iraq, as mentioned before, were not of principal
character. They can be better identified in opinions on “political and
diplomatic performance”. And thus CDU/CSU can benefit from good
personal relations with American partners which were maintained thanks
to respectable political rhetorics emphasising the moment of continuity
in Trans Atlantic relations as well as thanks to critical standpoint to
inefficient narrowly defined attitude of the government coalition. The
government coalition, on the other hand, has opportunities of political
action and decision making. And it is enough to say that these
opportunities are systematically used.
Brief Description of the Main Characteristics of the Islamic Fundamentalism
Jozef Hudec
The contribution is focused on a brief description of the
history and main characteristics of the Islamic fundamentalism. This
social phenomenon is going to be the most discussed item not only in the
internal security of several African and Asian countries but also in
their political relations to the Western countries, adherent to the idea
of the liberal democracy.
In the first chapter the meaning of the term “fundamentalism” is
described, together with the relation between ideology of fundamentalism
and radical militant persons or groups, using its philosophy. There are
some terminological examples shown, used for the phenomenon in English,
French and Arabic languages.
The second chapter mentions the extention of the Islam in the world –
in Asia, Africa and also in Europe. Despite the fact that Arabic
language is the lingua franca of the Islamic world, the Arabs represent
only a smaller part of the Moslem community. The heterogenity of
the Islamic society (umma) is also a basis for different variants
of Islamic fundamentalism.
Basic Islamic terms, such as koran (al-Kur´án), sunna, shi´a, umma,
shari´a, fikh, jahiliyya, shura, kufr, takfir, dair as-salam, dair
al-harb and jihad are briefly explained in the next chapter.
The fourth chapter is focused on the development of the reformative
ideology in Islam. There are four streams of thinking in the Islamic
society at the turn of the 19th and 20th century: sunnitic Islam based
of tradition of Khalifa; popular Islam of folk ideas and sects; secular
nationalism and Islamic reformism. Three main shapes of the reformism
were as follows: mass rural or tribal movements; Islamic modernism and
Egyptian salafiya.
Moslem Brothers Association represents one of the most influential
Islamic movements even in the present. Its origin and brief historical
outline in Egypt is described in the fifth chapter.
The next chapter lists reasons for the development of fundamentalism
from the 1970’s onwards. External political reasons, internal
political reasons, external economic reasons, internal economic reasons,
social reasons, moral and emotional reasons, and last but not least the
religious reasons are introduced among the most important sources of the
Islamistic revival. Also the main goals of the fundamentalist movements
are briefly mentioned in the chapter.
Present state and the international influence of the Islamic
fundamentalism is outlined in the last chapter. For the future it is
important to separate the legitimate return of the Moslem to their roots
from the misusing these traditionalist sentiments for militant or
terrorist purposes.
U.S. Foreign Policy towards Central Europe in 1989 – 1994
Barbora Gábelová
The year 1989 represented a historical milestone for the world
politics. Communism collapsed, the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union
disintegrated and countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea regained
their independence and started to establish new democratic and market
based political and economics systems. These processes represented a dramatic
change to all foreign policy actors who had to change their black and
white foreign policy strategy to a multicoloured one. Among the
most affected was the only post-Cold War superpower, the United States
of America. Before 1989 was the U.S. foreign policy towards Europe based
on containment, Marshall Plan and NATO – “Us” and “Them” were
clearly defined terms. After that year, former enemies became potential
allies and former allies were not as loyal as expected.
In this remarkable period of change Central Europe reappeared on the
ruins of the former Soviet block. Its core, represented by the so-called
Visegrad countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the
Slovak Republic, called for “historical satisfaction” for Yalta and
claimed a quick integration to the West. If Central Europe
considered the U.S. as its natural partner, how did “lone”
superpower perceived this region? The answer to this question is a matter
of this essay.
On the basis of the findings one can identify four alternatives to the
future of Central Europe. The first one was to preserve the status quo,
i.e. the system of two blocks. This seemed to be the easiest solution
and some of the West European countries and even the Soviet Union
preferred it before any radical changes. However, this alternative was
not acceptable to Central and East European countries which perceived it
as backward.
The second alternative was neutralisation of the Central European
region. This alternative appeared in the early 1990s as a form of
agreement between the main world powers. A plan for neutralisation
counted with a creation of some kind of a buffer zone between
the Soviet Union/Russia and the Western Europe. This was, of course,
unacceptable to the Central and Eastern European region itself, as well
as for the U.S. Administration.
The third alternative was a creation or support of creating some
sort of regional co-operation, either in Central Europe or in Europe as
whole. Both U.S. Administrations that were in power during the analyzed
period supported any attempt for regional co-operation in Central and
Eastern Europe while they were perceived as a prevention of
nationalist and ethnic tensions. However, while the U.S. considered
regional co-operation as an alternative to Central Europe’s
integration to NATO and the EU, countries of Central Europe considered
it as a means of faster integration to these structures.
The fourth alternative was the integration to West European structures,
to NATO and the EU. This was primary foreign policy goal of the Central
and East European countries and when all the other alternatives ceased
to be relevant, this alternative became one of the top foreign policy
goals of the Clinton Administration.
All of these alternatives evolved in the analysed time period and all of
them were for a certain time considered as a possible policy
towards the region. At the end, only one of them withstood all
challenges and became a “policy”. Thus, the time period from
1989 till 1994 represents a symbolic arch from uncertainty to an
open-door U.S. policy towards this region.
Germany and the Visegrad Four Countries
Wilma Jober
In this contribution the author offers a comprehensive view on
the German – V4 relations concerning the historical background,
bilateral agenda in the 90’s, the asymmetry, different attitudes and
the future of the mutual relations.
In the period of the 90’s the German – V4 relations were successful,
although certain perturbing influences can be observed. One of them is
the historical background as one of the most important factors of the
mutual relations, for example dissolution of Poland, Hitler – Stalin
Pact etc. The significance of the historical experience is underlined by
a different approach towards the Iraqi crisis. Another perturbing
influence is the asymmetry of the bilateral relations of Germany and the
individual V4 countries. Germany is more important for the Slovak
Republic, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of
Hungary than all these countries for Germany. It is applied to the
political as well as historical aspects. The asymmetry is not a
uniqueness of the German – V4 countries relations; it is the part of
the standard large – small countries relations. Thus the asymmetry in
German – V4 relations is the fact that can be hardly overcome. One of
the possibilities for the small countries to settle the differences is a
co-operation with the other small countries and thus influencing even
large ones.
Notwithstanding the objectives of the mutual relations – EU and NATO
enlargement – will be soon met, the relations between Germany and the
V4 countries maintain essential. The Union cannot tolerate the
differences in the cardinal political issues and therefore Germany must
avoid the differences in opinions on political objectives with its
neighbours and the future EU partners.
The very recent development has pointed out the fact that Germany will
have to attempt to explain and promote its own political objectives and
attitudes in international issues in more understandable way in the
future. In respect to this, importance of the Central and Eastern
European countries for Germany will increase. Furthermore, the V4
countries will have the important votes in the EU and NATO. To convince
the other countries, Germany must be sure about its own role and
objectives in the foreign policy (national consensus in foreign policy
remains the priority objective).
French-German Relations: Evaluation and Prospects
Stanislav Vallo
Recent French-German commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the
Elysian Treaty signing (January 22, 1963) posed, on one hand, the
opportunity to evaluate all positive and negative influences of the
bilateral relations and, on the other hand, the opportunity to
strengthen the basis of the extraordinary relations set by the
abovementioned Treaty. At the beginning of the contribution, author
offers the brief historical overview of the mutual relations from the
June 1, 1948 when France signed the “London Recommendations”
assuming the establishment of the Central German Administration until
the September 23, 2002 when G. Schröder was reelected.
On 40th anniversary of the Elysian Treaty signing, the 80th
French-German summit was held on January 22 – 23, 2003 in Paris and
Berlin. In the context of bilateral relations this summit will be
considered as one of the most significant steps on the path towards the
closest co-operation in the all fields of the German and French
societies’ lives. For the very first time in the history of mutual
relations, the joint meeting of the governments and parliaments of the
both countries was held.
At the governments representatives’ meeting, the ministers informed
about the achievements, current situation and prospects for the
bilateral co-operation. They also adopted the decision to establish the
post of the “Secretary General for a French-German Co-operation” who
would be responsible for providing impulses and new ideas for the
development of mutual relations.
Notwithstanding the meeting of the parliaments was of important
anniversary commemoration character, the highest representatives of both
countries stressed the further improvement of the mutual relations
especially in the fields of education, culture, science and people to
people contacts in their speeches.
The Joint Declaration adopted at this meeting represents the document of
significant importance for the further development and the deepening of
the French-German co-operation in all fields. The text of the single
articles stemmed from the eagerness of both countries to deepen
significantly the mutual linkages on the level of the population, to
improve the standards of the mutual recognition and to reform the
political dialogue.
It can be stated that France and Germany showed willingness to
incorporate new ideas into the areas where the co-operation has had a tradition
and thus they have raised the future co-operation to a higher
level. In general, it can be said that such significant strengthening
and deepening of the relations can be conducive for other, not only
European countries if these will be able to perceive this process in the
context of international policy in its whole complexity.
Slovak-German Relations in the Context of the German Foreign Policy
Marianna Oravcová
In the period of 1998 – 2002, the bilateral Slovak-German relations
were of a good and stable nature, developing with positive inner
dynamics. The relations were built on the following factors: the
compensation of contact and co-operative political deficits from the
previous period, valuable partnership considering the interests of the
Slovak Republic as a smaller partner, appreciation of the ongoing
democratic changes, and last but not least the support of the accession
process of the Slovak Republic to NATO and the EU. A positive
evaluation of the Slovak Republic by Germany at the same time had a positive
influence on the interior political development of Slovakia.
The last election in the Slovak Republic and Germany, held on the same
day (21. 9. 2002), confirmed the previous political orientation aiming
at the further development of the bilateral relations. Moreover, the
results were positive also due to the fact that the new period of
optimistic prospects concerning the NATO Summit in Prague and the EU
Summit in Copenhagen started with the Germans’ proclaimed support for
the Slovak Republic.
During the elections, internal process of the development of the German
foreign policy resulted in the stage when German foreign policy,
similarly to the French one, became “the matter of the boss”. Since
2001, this phenomenon was preceded by steps towards its emancipation in
respect to the current military challenges predominantly in the field of
security policy. In 2001, the security dimension of the German foreign
policy changed quickly and radically compared to the four decades of the
Cold War and the whole period since German unification. Thus the after
war period of the German foreign policy characteristic for
selfrestriction finished and the change of the Security Policy Doctrine
as well as the change of paradigm came into being. The opportunity to
declare politically “taking over more responsibility“ in
international community corresponding with the size and importance of
the unified country (2001) appeared; the Chancellor’s elections’
slogan of the “German way“ (the summer of 2002) was the next option;
and finally, an individual refusal attitude towards the War on Iraq
(2002/2003). Despite the different opinions on the Iraqi crisis
solution, the Schröder’s Government never questioned the
transatlantic pillar of the German foreign policy and preventively
warned of antiamericanism. The eminent interest in the maintenance of
the transatlantic relations and the prevention from antiamericanism as
well as seeking the common European standpoint despite the different
attitudes towards the war against Iraq remains included in the common
attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Slovak Republic.
To overcome the different position, Germany intensified the dialogue
with the future members. Thanks to continuing communication the pro-
-American motivation of the signatories of the Letter of Eight and the
Declaration of V10 became clear as neither anti-European nor anti-German
rather quickly. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
of Germany J. Fisher assured that the priority of the German foreign
policy remained the EU enlargement and the dialogue with the candidate
countries on the future structure of the EU. This attitude was reflected
even in the Slovak – German relations after Germany had listened to
Slovak arguments and standpoints emphasising the need for the dialogue
among the old and the new member countries about substantial issues
which became of secondary importance due to the urgency of tasks
resulting from the accession process.
The Slovak counterpart appreciates the continuity and the
consequentiality of the German attitude in the issue of the EU
enlargement. The Slovak Republic welcomes positively German interest in
the improvement of the communication, which is understood as the
acceptance of the new member countries’ expectations that they are
going to be included not excluded from the institutional mechanisms. As
it is shown in bilateral consultations concerning future of the EU, the
major German (to be more exact German-French) proposals are acceptable
for the Slovak Republic, although the differences are not negligible.
In respect to this it is enough to say that debate on Beneš Decrees
issues, being raised in Germany in the spring of 2002 again, has never
been turned against Slovakia and has never had a negative influence
either on dynamics and the quality of bilateral relations or the change
of the attitude of German society towards Slovakia. The German
Government has never proclaimed the opposition’s requirement and has
not set the revision of the legal system (which would practically mean
its abolition) of the candidate countries as a condition of
accession to the EU.
As far as NATO is concerned, the German Government achieved the
following: firstly, German society perceives NATO as positively as never
before. Even the previous critics do not question NATO. Secondly, which
is more surprising, Bundeswehr employment in out of area is generally
accepted.
All the political parties agree on support for NATO enlargement. The
Federal Republic of Germany, considering its permanently supportive
attitude towards NATO enlargement, does not intend to be a problematic
country in the process of ratification due to technically more difficult
procedure compared to other European countries (the bicameral
confirmation is required considering that the opposition occupies the
majority in Bundesrat). Therefore, in Germany the ratification process
of the Slovak Republic accession as well as other six countries should
be confirmed by the majority of votes.
Based on the experience with the Iraqi crisis, the need for European
foreign policy with its defence and security dimension has become a major
issue. Germany has been taking initial steps towards its institutional
realisation. The Government declaration of the Bundes Chancellor from
April 3, 2003 as well as the standpoints of J. Fisher in German Budestag
indicate the fact that Germany examines the opportunities of new
positions after the end of the Iraqi crisis. The new position is
expected to bring the improvement in relationship with the USA together
with strengthening of the EU as an important foreign policy and security
factor globally. The success of this policy would mean a stronger
position of CFSP and thus moderating the new member countries’,
including the Slovak Republic, dilemma. The candidate countries
contemplate where to put an emphasis of their foreign policy and search
for the balance in individual decision as well as in the co-operation
within international organisations.
The Slovak Republic is becoming the member of the EU in the period when
in the consequence of the Iraqi crisis and the war the relations among
the EU member countries undergo a test. The two problematic issues
have risen in the EU: the first one among the member countries, the
second between the member countries and the candidate countries. The
German foreign policy has been put into a new situation by the
Iraqi crisis as well as the new period of relations has been
established. This also means a number of messages and expectations
towards the candidate countries.
Messages: the need for EU coherence (more co-operation will prevent the
confrontation), the need for the grouping of responsibilities and a common
new methodology of conflict management, the return of the debate on
substantial issues (predominantly on transatlantic relations, foreign
policy, defence and security) to the EU – latest in parallel with the
implementation of Convent’s conclusions, strengthening of EU military
capacities as EU will not be viewed as a strong partner without
effective SEBOP, last but not least the maintenance of transatlantic
relations as a pillar of the German foreign policy.
Expectations: the new member countries will express solidarity necessary
for the strengthening of the position of EU as a global player, the
new member countries will bring dynamics into CSFP assuming that they
will fully participate in its realisation, the common effort should aim
at strengthening of the UN position not at its weakening.
The fundamental problem remains in the field of finding new way to
restore the original double-pillar architecture of German foreign policy
which has been simple and effective at the same time and which Germany
according to its policy does not want to get rid of and as the Iraqi
crisis showed, cannot do so. The renewal of the transatlantic relations
can overcome the problematic issue in the EU. And thus the EU can be
communicated to the new members in the image which will be closer to the
one in the period before the Iraqi crisis. The question is, whether EU
is able to rebuild its relations within the USA – EU – NATO triangle
in a way which will prevent the situation of choosing the allies.
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