Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press
Vol. XII / No 3 / 2003
ŠTÚDIE, ANALÝZY - STUDIES, ANALYSIS
Stredná a východná Európa v období novej neistoty
Central and Eastern Europe In an Age of New UncertaintyWhy the EU – US Economic Relationship Matters
Prečo záleží na hospodárskych vzťahoch EÚ a USA36 Matúš Korba
Nová bezpečnostná stratégia USA a transatlantické vzťahy
The New American National Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations
ÚVAHY, ROZPRAVY, ROZHOVORY - REFLECTIONS, TRANSACTIONS, INTERVIEWS
EÚ a NATO: partneri či súperi?
The European Union and NATO: Partners or Rivals?71 Martin Klus
Vízia modelu Európy budúcnosti
Vision of Future Model of the European Union84 Viktor Krupa
Etnická a religiózna mozaika Indonézie
Ethnic and Religious Mosaic of Indonesia
RECENZIE, SPRÁVY
97 Ján Voderadský
BUDIL, Ivo T. – FLIEDR, Bob – HALÍK, Tomáš – HEKRDLA, Martin – KOMÁREK, Stanislav – KREJČÍ, Oskar – KROPÁČEK, Luboš – MENDEL, Miloš – NÁLEVKA, Vladimír – ZBOŘIL, Zdeněk: Střet civilizací? – Žhavé sondy deseti autoru.
Evropský literární klub, 1. vydanie, Praha 2002, ISBN 80-86316-31-9103 Martin Štoffa
Ettmayer, W.: Vojny a konferencie. Diplomacia predtým a teraz
Kriege und Konferenzen. Diplomatie einst und jetzt. Inštitút pre stratégiu a bezpečnostnú politiku, Viedeň 2003, 96 strán, ISBN 3-901328-88-2108 Peter Juza
IŠTOK, Robert : Politická geografia a geopolitika. Prešov 2003, 392 strán, ISBN 80-8068-191-0
111 Peter Juza
KOROLEV, K. (ed.): Klasika geopolitiky, 19. storočie
Klassika geopolitiki, 19. vek. Terra Fantastica, Sankt Peterburg 2003, 718 strán, ISBN 5-17-017281-8
Central and Eastern Europe In an Age of New Uncertainty
Ronald D. Asmus
During the last decade countries of Central and Eastern Europe
regained their independence and succeeded in establishing new democratic
and market based political and economics system. These countries
reoriented their foreign policies from the East to the West. Soviet
troops were withdrawn, the Warsaw Pact demised and a new goal in
that time concerned visionary and unreachable was set: to rejoin the
West by joining the EU and NATO. These goals are either achieved or
within reach. The region became stabilized, more democratic and less
threatened than at any point in recent memory. Attention of the West is
now focused several hundred kilometres eastward. In this time the
Western Alliance is increasingly divided and in disarray. The core
institutions – the European Union and NATO – that many assumed were
more or less permanent elements of a new post-Cold War security
order suddenly after differences over the Iraq issue seem fragile.
Looking ahead one can identify three major challenges the region of
Central and Eastern Europe will face in the decade ahead. The first one
lies across the Atlantic; the second one within Europe; and the third
one is at home.
The first challenge lying across the Atlantic concerns NATO and its
internal discrepancies. And it goes far beyond the specifics of Iraq. On
one side there stand so-called structuralists arguing that the growing
asymmetry of power is fundamentally reshaping different American and
European views of the world and thus a US-European break-up was
increasingly likely if not inevitable. The opposing view is that the
conflict was not at all inevitable and is largely attributable to the
different impact September 11th had on US and European thinking and thus
the real problem is the lack of a common sense on strategic purpose
or paradigm. Different analyses lead to different policy prescriptions
of the way forward. If the problem is rooted in an asymmetry in power
and outlook, then there is little prospect of fixing it. Europe will not
be an important strategic partner of the US in the future and NATO will
not be a central institution. The second school wants to preserve
NATO but avoid the kind of fractious debates. They argue that NATO needs
to be maintained to preserve a trans-Atlantic link and sustain a pool
of military forces that can be called into on an ad hoc basis by future
coalitions of the willing. According to the third school of thought the
Alliance can only be saved through radical reform that re-harmonises
strategic perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic.
What does this all mean for Central and Eastern Europe? Well, these
countries are joining an Alliance that is not the smoothly oiled and
well functioning machine they thought it was. The central question
facing all allies, both new and old, is whether they want to tackle the
new threats of the 21st century on a trans-Atlantic basis. If NATO
is going to remain central to American foreign policy, it has to address
those challenges that are central to American and Western security. For
Central and Eastern Europe this mean that if they wanted the US to
remain fully engaged in Europe over time, then they must join with
Washington in pushing for the broader transformation of the Alliance.
Many Central and Eastern European leaders have fewer reservations on
fighting totalitarianism out of Europe than their Western European
counterparts. But we have also seen limits to such support. The first is
in terms of capability. Another issue is how deeply Atlanticism is
rooted in these societies. Will these countries be able to stand up and
support the United States again in another crisis if major European
powers like France and Germany are again opposed to such a course?
The second challenge facing Central and Eastern Europe lies in Europe
and centres on the future construction of the European Union and
European integration more generally. One can see many differences among
EU members about what the EU is all about, who speaks for Europe and how
to shape relations with the United States. There are claims the EU has
already overcome similar crises and emerged ever stronger, but, is it
true? In recent months one thing became clear: it is that the future
health and vitality of NATO and the EU are inherently and inevitably
intertwined.
What does this mean for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe? A “return
to Europe” was a driving force behind the reform process and
engine that drove these countries to work so hard to catch up with the
countries of Western Europe. The instincts of many of these countries
will be to side with the United Kingdom. Central and Eastern Europe view
American power and influence as an opportunity to be exploited, not as a problem
to be countered. As small and medium-sized countries they will tend not
to be federalist but intergovernmental. But they will be careful to
antagonize the two key continental powers – France and Germany. It is
one thing to stand up against France and Germany on occasion and on a specific
issue. It is quite another to pursue a course that pits them
against these two countries across a wider range of issues.
The third challenge facing Central and Eastern Europe lies at home. It
is the ability of the countries to successfully continue the process of
political and economic reform process and the rebuilding of their
societies started in 1989. Though an extraordinary amount has already
been made much remains still to be done. It is also not so hard to se a reform
fatigue in societies that have been pushed hard to change. The results
are mixed and the fruits of progress are unevenly distributed. An
initial wave of pro-Western reformist leaders is gradually stepping down
from the political stage. Both equally committed reformers and populist
politicians are replacing them. One can also see warning signs of
political fragmentation, economic slowdown and, in some cases, even
nationalistic and/or populist temptations. The last decade was one of
great progress and accomplishment for Central and Eastern Europe, the
next decade may turn out to be an age of new uncertainties and
challenges.
Having achieved their desired destination of NATO and EU membership, the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe find themselves entering
institutions that themselves are struggling to adapt themselves to the
challenges of a new era. From the first day of their membership
they are expected to take active part in an important discussion about
the future of NATO and the EU. If there is one lesson from the last
decade that can serve as a compass for the future, it is that
Central and Eastern Europe is much better off when these countries
proactively seek to take their future into its own hands, when they work
together as a region and when they followed their own instincts and
went against the prevailing conventional wisdom in the West.
Prečo záleží na hospodárskych vzťahoch EÚ a USA
Ingrid Brocková
Európska únia (EÚ) a USA sú najdôležitejšími partnermi
podporujúcimi a výrazne formujúcimi svetový obchodný systém.
Transatlantické partnerstvo predstavuje ročne transakcie vo výške
cca 2500 mld. USD, pričom poskytuje 12-miliónovú zamestnanosť na
oboch stranách Atlantiku. Za obdobie posledných 50 rokov každý
„progres“ vo svetovom obchodnom systéme bol výsledkom iniciatívy
a dohody EÚ a USA. V prípade, že tieto dva bloky nie sú
schopné dospieť k dohode, ako to bolo v oblasti poľnohospodárstva
v Uruguajskom kole obchodných rokovaní, je malá šanca na úspech
posunúť liberalizáciu obchodného systému smerom dopredu.
Dôkazom transatlantickej ekonomickej previazanosti je Nová
transatlantická agenda (NTA) a v rámci nej dialóg podnikateľskej
komunity – Transatlantický obchodný dialóg (TABD). Ich prioritnou náplňou
je budovanie bezbariérového trhu liberalizáciou už aj tak dosť
otvorených obchodných a investičných vzťahov a dotváraním
efektívnejšieho mechanizmu riešenia vzájomných obchodných sporov.
TABD je dobrým príkladom toho, kedy sa regionálne fórum môže stať
vhodnou platformou na expandovanie jeho agendy na multilaterálne fórum
v globálnom meradle. Charakter dialógu TABD-vláda povzbudzuje
kooperatívnejšie hospodárske vzťahy medzi EÚ a USA.
Vytvorením Svetovej obchodnej organizácie (WTO) mnohí experti
predpovedali, že globálne obchodné rokovania sa stanú redundantnými.
Nie je to tak. Nové kolo globálnych obchodných rokovaní, spustené v Dohe
(2001), to len potvrdzuje. Nie je jednoduchšie ako tie kolá predchádzajúce.
Naopak, zložitejšie, pretože agenda WTO pokrýva už politicky senzitívne
otázky, ktoré sú veľmi úzko naviazané na domácu reguláciu
jednotlivých štátov. Tieto problémy navyše rieši organizácia,
ktorá má veľmi diverzifikovanú členskú základňu. V prevažnej
miere sú členskými krajinami rozvojové krajiny, ktoré majú odlišné
záujmy od krajín bohatých, ale majú značné rozdiely aj medzi
sebou. Nie je preto prekvapujúce, že nové kolo globálnych obchodných
rokovaní napreduje veľmi pomaly.
Ministerská schôdzka v Cancúne (september 2003) je vnímaná ako
katalyzátor a kľúčový test pre vlády, či to myslia s liberalizáciou
seriózne. Najmä USA a EÚ by mali byť príkladom. Kritickou
oblasťou je poľnohospodárstvo. Bez progresu v otázkach s ním
spojených je ťažké predpokladať progres v ďalšej liberalizácii
priemyselných taríf a obchodu v službách. Takisto je
potrebné vyriešiť otázku dodávok liekov pre rozvojové krajiny.
Článok pojednáva o dvoch výzvach spojených s novým kolom
globálnych obchodných rokovaní: 1. vzťah EÚ a USA a 2.
agenda rozvojových krajín. Vzťahy EÚ a USA sú mimoriadne dôležité
pre úspech WTO. Ostatné členské krajiny síce uznávajú fakt, že
bez nich žiadny progres v rokovaniach nie je možný, na druhej
strane sa však obávajú, že ich vlastné záujmy budú potlačené v prípade
dohody dvoch veľmocí. Otvorenými otázkami ich vzťahov je poľnohospodárstvo
(zníženie podpory americkým farmárom, reforma CAP), dodávka liekov
pre rozvojové krajiny (silne ovplyvňovaná lobingom farmaceutických
amerických firiem). Agendou EÚ zostáva presadenie diskutovania
investičných pravidiel, verejného obstarávania na pôde WTO, čo je
silne oponované rozvojovými krajinami. Nepodstatnou nie je ani úloha
domácej politiky v USA a EÚ v nadchádzajúcom období
– prezidentské voľby v USA a rozširovanie EÚ.
Samostatnou výzvou je fakt, že Doha kolo má ambíciu nazývať sa
„rozvojovým“.
Dobrá tzv. „pro-Doha“ dohoda by mohla priniesť zníženie taríf
aj v bohatých, aj chudobných krajinách s prínosom vo výške
až 520 mld. USD. Zvýšila by hospodársky rast v rozvojových
krajinách a do roku 2015 by pomohla cca 140 mil. ľuďom vymaniť
sa z chudoby. Platné pravidlá WTO sú síce ďaleko od perfektných,
ale pravda je, že neschopnosť rozvojových krajín získať výhody z obchodu
samotného, nie je otázkou nerovnakých príležitostí; v mnohých
prípadoch je to dôsledok neschopnosti ich využitia (chýbajúce
kapacity a zdroje). Neúspešné krajiny s malým počtom
produktívnych priemyselných odvetví nemôžu očakávať zázraky z rastu
vyvolaného exportom (vyžaduje si to múdru makroekonomickú politiku,
budovanie infraštruktúry, systému vzdelávania a zdravotníctva).
Liberalizácia, kombinovaná s dobrou domácou hospodárskou
politikou, je silným prispievateľom hospodárskeho rastu a vyššieho
životného štandardu.
Neochota priemyselných krajín načúvať požiadavkám rozvojových
krajín môže mať za dôsledok aj zníženie kredibility a legitímnosti
samotnej WTO. WTO má byť organizácia založená na konsenzuálnom
rozhodovaní, nie fungujúca ako exkluzívny klub bohatých krajín.
Svet je ešte ďaleko od plnej liberalizácie, špeciálne v oblastiach
kľúčových pre rozvojové krajiny.
Globálna prosperita a medzinárodná bezpečnosť veľmi závisia
od kooperatívnosti transatlantického vzťahu. Krajiny bohatého severu
sa spustením kola globálnych rokovaní v Dohe zaviazali ku konkrétnym
krokom smerujúcim k otvoreniu ich trhov, zníženiu dotácií do
poľnohospodárstva a pozornosti záujmom rozvojových krajín.
Doterajší vývoj však skôr nasvedčuje tomu, že bohaté krajiny
pretláčajú záujmy svojich domácich konštituencií. Zatiaľ
vyhliadka na úspešné ukončenie kola do roku 2004 je minimálna. Kolo
má šancu byť úspešné, ak sa krajiny opäť vrátia k prioritným
princípom: ako najlepšie integrovať rozvojové krajiny do globálnej
ekonomiky. Liberalizácia obchodu nie je dostatočná na generovanie
rozvoja ako takého, ale je dobrým začiatkom.
Kolaps rokovaní by bol tragédiou. Po prvé, nové kolo globálnych
obchodných rokovaní je príležitosťou reformovať obchodné pravidlá,
ktoré systematicky znevýhodňujú najchudobnejšie krajiny sveta. Po
druhé, neúspešnosť rokovaní môže akcelerovať trend smerom k regionalizmu,
bilateralizmu, prípadne k unilateralizmu, presadzujúc
protekcionistické politiky, čo by malo za následok fragmentáciu globálnej
ekonomiky a potlačenie multilaterálneho systému založeného na
princípoch nediskriminácie. Najviac postihnutými by opäť boli malé
a slabé krajiny. Po tretie, môže v dlhodobom meradle oslabiť
WTO ako inštitúciu.
The New American National Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations
Matúš Korba
The National Security Strategy released (NSS) on September 20, 2002
by the White House may be the most significant US foreign policy
statement since NSC 68, the 1950 document that codified the containment
strategy of Cold War. The new strategy is a long-overdue
codification of the principles underlying President George W. Bush’s
foreign a security policy approach.
The body of the NSS makes it clear that American forces will be strong
enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military
build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United
States. President G. W. Bush at the West Point speech in June 2002 put
it more bluntly: “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths
beyond challenge.” Although military aspect of NSS is important, it is
just one part of a more fundamental and more palatable new
strategic approach: to tackle, rather than tolerate, the roots of global
problems. US diplomatic and economic policies must work to encourage
this national security strategy, the document says. Free markets, free
trade zones, diplomatic initiatives and public health efforts can be
just as important as military campaigns, it notes. The new American
security strategy adopts a clear and newly-emphasised thrust: to
increase security and economic development by using unrivalled US power
and influence to expand freedom and open societies around the world. As
in past calls for interventionist foreign policies, the G. W. Bush
administration argues effectively that promoting US values overseas
ultimately also advances US security.
Changing threats mean changing responses, and defence and security
experts and analysts have termed the NSS 2002 the most radical reshaping
of the strategy since the end of the Cold War. The threats of terrorism
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have forced a fundamental
reshaping of national security strategy. How the United States defends
the homeland has shifted from a strategy of deterrence to one of
pre-emption, according to the new strategy. A new emphasis on
“pre-emptive” attacks against adversaries may be the hottest topic
in news coverage of the new strategy. The strategy proposes expanding
the relatively uncontroversial concept of true pre-emption – striking
first against an imminent, specific, near certain attack – to the far
broader concept of striking first to prevent the possibility of a longer
term threat even developing, which might better be labelled preventive
war. It is also the concept underscored in President Bush’s
introductory message. The rationale for the shift appears to be twofold:
to deal with actors who cannot be reliably deterred, and to address the
enormous threat posed by the spread of WMD.
Deterrence served the United States well during the Cold War when it
confronted the Soviet Union in a nuclear stand-off. Use of nuclear
weapons would have meant massive retaliation and “mutually assured
destruction”. The NSS 2002 document says the government will defend
the United States “by identifying and destroying the threat before it
reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to
enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate
to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by
acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing
harm against our people and our country”.
The NSS 2002 document insists, the ultimate goal of new American
strategy must be to spread democracy everywhere. The United States must
finish the job that W. Wilson started. The world, quite literally, must
be made safe for democracy. The Bush NSS, therefore, differs in from its
recent predecessors. It’s proactive. It rejects the B. Clinton
administration’s assumption that since the movement toward democracy
and market economics had become irreversible in the post-Cold War era,
all the United States had to do was “engage” with the rest of the
world to “enlarge” those processes. G. W. Bush administration,
unlike several of its predecessors, sees no contradiction between power
and principles. It is, in this sense, thoroughly Wilsonian.
But the new strategy is not an American “go-it-alone” tract. G. W.
Bush said in the document the United States would work with all
like-minded states. The strategy specifically calls for strengthened
alliances to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks. It encourages
countries to act regionally to isolate terrorists and deny terrorists
havens. The vision is one in which the core democratic-capitalist states
(America, NATO allies, Europe generally, and regionally-based geographic
outliers like Japan and Australia) will convert their previously
defensive, reactive posture into a more proactive, forceful world
presence. As stated in the NSS 2002 document, the US will work to expand
NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to
share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests. The US
will try to ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have
appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare.
This notion is seen, for instance, in the various D. Rumsfeld trips to
Europe to sell NATO allies on the idea of a modernised NATO
military machine that could be deployed for offensive operations well
outside the bounds of Europe itself. As seen by the G. W. Bush
administration, this European capability would not just address
intra-state ethnic quarrels, which is the threat currently motivating
and dominating European debates about the future of EU combined
capabilities and its common defence posture. Rather, Europe would
develop the same assessments of global threats to the democratic core,
and actively work with the United States in military operations to
prevent, pre-empt, and thwart such global threats-in-being, and in the
process, ideally expand the democratic core even further outwards.
Europeans noted with satisfaction that the chapter of the National
security strategy 2002 devoted to co-operation with “other main
centers of global power” begins with Europe. The document, however,
steers wide clear of addressing what promises to be the most divisive
issue in US-European relations, namely the future division of defence
responsibilities between NATO and the European Union’s own defence
apparatus and, by extension, the United States and the European Union.
Nevertheless, the rest of the text carries a message that will not
be lost on US allies in Europe: the United States intends to
reinvigorate NATO as a collective defence institution, thus
implying a scale-back of US and perhaps even NATO involvement in
non-defensive missions such as peacekeeping. A pre-emptive use of
force will be task of “ad-hoc” coalitions of willing and able
nations, and will likely not be among NATO’s future missions. In this
context Europe will delegate many other types of operations –
peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions, conflict prevention – to the
EU’s new defence arm in the framework of European Security and Defence
Policy. The relations between NATO and EU are becoming more and more
important not only for efficiency of European security architecture, but
also for homogeneity of transatlantic links between USA and its European
allies.
The European Union and NATO: Partners or Rivals?
Tomáš Valášek
Member states of the European Union differ in their views on the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). There is disagreement over
how ambitious ESDP should eventually become and, more importantly,
whether it should complement or replace the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Future actions by EU members – decisions such as
whether to conduct the planned military operation in Moldova with or
without NATO cooperation – could set the two institutions on a path
toward competition.
The tensions spring in part from a shift in priorities of many EU
member states. In a world without a Communist threat, their
security strategies are increasingly more focused on spreading a particular
vision of a world order. This mission civilatrice has come to
upstage defense as the traditional focus of the countries’ security
policies. The European mission civilatrice, as expressed in the recent
draft EU security strategy released in June 2003, calls for member
states to build a “stronger international society, well
functioning international institutions and a rule-based
international order”. It has a markedly different focus from the
September 2002 US National Security Strategy, which stresses the need to
promote democratization of domestic political systems in countries
around the world. While both the EU and the United States agree that
democracy is important, their differing priorities led them to clash
over the right, under international law, to promote a regime change
(in Iraq) by force. The dispute paralyzed NATO and turned the attention
of many European countries to the European Union as a possible
alternative venue. A security policy conducted under EU auspices
would absolve the countries of the need to reconcile their viewpoint
with the United States, and allow them to leverage security policies
with trade and other tools of foreign policy already being coordinated
at the EU level. For the conduct of a security policy focusing not
on defense but on a European vision of proper world order, the
European Union becomes a far more attractive vehicle than NATO.
Washington further aggravated relations among the allies by stating that
“the mission defines the coalition”, thus putting in question its
own commitment to NATO.
A security and defense policy focusing on advancing Europe’s mission
civilatrice would posit the EU as a soft-power alternative to the
United States. It would satisfy proponents of European autonomy by
clearly separating Europe’s identity from that of the United States,
while also pleasing those EU states who see little need in the current
security environment for a use of military forces. It is less clear,
however, whether Europe could thus deter the threat of catastrophic
terrorism. Already the French authorities uncovered and foiled a ploy
to crash a hijacked airliner into the Eiffel Tower. Also, Europe
may choose not to partake in US security policy but it may not be able
to shield itself from consequences of a possible failure of those
policies. The European Union depends on Middle Eastern oil to an even
larger extent than the United States.
In theory, Europe could also ‘grow teeth’ – develop military
capabilities enabling it to independently carry out operations such as
the one in Afghanistan in 2001 – 2002. But this may require more
political will than is in evidence in Europe today. The military
spending of all European states combined is less than the US defense
budget. Some of the most vocal proponents of more autonomy for EU
defense efforts – the Brussels Four (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and
France) are also, with the exception of France, the lowest spenders of
all NATO members. The quest for a more ambitious ESDP seems rooted
in an essentially pacifist intellectual tradition, which makes creation
of the EU ‘with teeth’ highly unlikely.
For Slovakia, whose declared foreign and security policy ties the
country’s defense to NATO, the dispute within the European Union
portends several potential pitfalls as well as advantages. First, it
behooves the Bratislava government to pay closer attention to defense
developments in Brussels, whether within the EU framework (the European
Convention, ESDP) or outside (the Summit of Four), and to carefully
judge their impact on Slovakia’s interest in maintaining a strong
and viable NATO. But one must also address the cause rather than the
symptoms of the current tensions between Europe and the United States.
One possible avenue of rapprochement is a dialogue on a new
understanding of a state’s right to self-defense under the
international law; one that would take into account new threats such as
the potential marriage of catastrophic terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. There seems to be a renewed willingness in Europe,
despite the Iraq debacle, to consider the prevention concept laid out in
the 2002 US National Security Strategy. Even a small country like
Slovakia could gain considerable diplomatic capital from ability to
recognize the right moment and initiate such dialogue, not unlike Norway
did with the Oslo peace process.
Vision of Future Model of the European Union
Martin Klus
Discussions of the European Convention, which summoning was result of
effort to define a mission of the European Union and demeanors, how
European Union can this mission subserve that it can operate as
democratic and transparent, were ceremoniously finished in the end of
June.
Their output is the introduction of the Draft Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe. Its role is a European Union reform, to make it
easier and effectively operating entity.
This difficult role could be done through unification of its normative
base – Establishing Treaties. They could be clear and comprehensible,
without change in their substance and processes of behavior of their
institutional architecture and legislative implements of the European
Union. This could lead to an approach of the European Union to European
citizens.
To make a compromise about this important question between various
groups and even between member and candidate countries within the Union
difficult. The Final Draft Treaty establishing the Constitution for
Europe reflects it. It should resolve questions such as absence of
tripartite power common at national level, requirement of separation
between normative and executive in institutional base in the European
Union, strengthen the power of national parliaments, reform of the
European Parliament, reform of decision making sphere in the European
Union, future possibility of two columns European Union structure,
review of double – track Europe etc.
It’s more than possible, that Draft Treaty establishing the
Constitution for Europe introduced by the European Convention, which
“effectiveness, simplification and approaching to European citizens”
is more than controversial will be a subject to change during the
Intergovernmental Conference which will include members and candidate
countries of the European Union. Finally this Conference decides about
the final version of the document primary determining future Europe.
In hoc, I’ve tried to introduce for a public discussion for lay and
special community, a Vision of future model of European Union, as one of
European integration development possibilities in closer and distant
future, replenish-ed with all criteria defined by the European
Convention like an initial for a future European Constitution treaty.
Model is divided into three parts. In the first part, I’ve tried to
make a proposal for new, reformed European institutions and legislative
processes within the European Union.
The second one consist of answers on questions about future of the three
columns structure and vertical division of powers in the European Union.
Finally I didn’t leave unanswered controversial questions about
delimitation of Europe as a continent and political body and looking for
a capital city of Europe.
Ethnic and Religious Mosaic of Indonesia
Viktor Krupa
At the beginning of the contribution the author deals with the
historical development of the Indonesian borders within southeastern
Asian region. He claims that the borders were formed naturally, based on
the similar way of life, economy, culture as well as openness to the
surrounding civilizations. According to the author, historical unity is
significantly demonstrated by the level of language, even though it is
the source of fragmentation. Except for a few areas, all the languages
of the present Indonesia belong to one group known as austronesian.
In the next part of the article, the author analyses the development of
the cultural, political, religious and language system since the
prehistoric settlement period up to the presence with all its aspects.
The author stresses the fact that the development in Indonesia was
affected by more cultural influences than any other Asian country. India
posed one of the most influential factors although the Indian models
were not borrowed automatically but adapted to the local conditions.
Indonesia did not accept the system of castes notwithstanding the
Hinduism prevailed for a certain period in Indonesia. Differentiation of
this originally homogenous region was influenced by the flow of the
cultural aspects from China as well as from the northwestern India. The
southern part was modified by the massive and fast formation of Islam
and a relative opennes to the European influences.
From the beginning of the 13th century, new integration tendencies were
seen in a new universal religion – Islam, spreading into this region.
The success of Islam in Indonesia is caused by the fact that it was not
the strict Islam, but rather Islam influenced by Sufism. Islam was not
spread throughout Indonesia equally. For example in Java, there are
groups of strict Islamists; followers of Islam adapted to the Indonesian
conditions with its pre-Islamic and animist features and finally, people
emphasising the heritage of animism and Hinduism as well as a large
group of Christians in Sumatra. During the Sukarno era, the tolerance of
religions was ideal but during the Suharto period more serious local
conflicts occurred. While in the past Indonesia had to face the problem
from the outside world, nowadays there are more complex inner issues –
social, economic, as well as potentially religious and ethnic –
manifested in the local separatism.
The author also stresses the important aspect of Indonesian language
development. Language and ethnic fragmentation of the state required
homogeneous language and thus Indonesian language (local variant of
Malaysian language) became an official one. The author further describes
the historical development of the language, its spreading and usage with
all its features in detail.
In the next part of this contribution, the author explains the
multiethnicity as a typical phenomenon and a source of conflicts in
Indonesia.
In December 1975, Indonesia annexed East Timor, former Portuguese
colony, after it had proclaimed independence, which was considered the
most acute problem caused by the Indonesian government. The annexation
was agreed by the USSR as well as the USA. The world hesitated to speak
loudly about Asian colonization even though the Indonesian
administration was harder than the European one and took a lot of lives
of the East Timor population.
Next potential centers of separatism are in Molucs – north from East
Timor. Molucs posed the core of the autonomous state in eastern
Indonesia. South Molucs upraised against the Indonesian government in
1950 and proclaimed an independent state lasting for a short period of
time. In the last two years, riots, armed conflicts between Christians
and Muslims and vandalisms in Molucs have appeared again. More
problematic is the future of Irian Jaya (west of New Guinea) which
became a part of Indonesia in 1965. This decision was confirmed by the
plebiscite in 1969, although Irian has nothing in common culturally and
ethnically with the rest of Indonesia. Notwithstanding the fact that the
territory of Irian there is rich in natural resources, aboriginal
inhabitants have never benefited from it at all and therefore the
Operation Free Papua Movement started with its sabotages. There is still
guerilla war in the inland going on.
The three-above mentioned centers of resistance are located in the
eastern part of Indonesia and are occupied by the non-Muslim population.
The fourth, very serious and chronic center lies in the western part of
Indonesia – in the north of Sumatra – occupied by Muslim Acehians.
They formed the Free Aceh Movement requiring Aceh independence from
Indonesia.
The oncoming future of Indonesia will be undoubtedly hectic. However, it
would be untimely to speak about the dissolution of Indonesia. The
future of Indonesia depends on ability to overcome the old centralistic
model and replace it by the system, which would take into consideration
the interests of individual regions with their specific economic and
cultural needs.
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