Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press
Vol. XIII / No 2 / 2004
ŠTÚDIE, ANALÝZY – STUDIES, ANALYSIS
Niektoré inštitucionálne aspekty začleňovania Slovenskej republiky do Európskej únie
Some of the Institutional Aspects of Integration of the Slovak Republic into the European Union
Zahraničná migrácia v Slovenskej republike: Súčasný stav a predpokladaný vývoj po vstupe krajiny do Európskej únie
International Migration in the Slovak Republic: Its Contemporary State and Expected Development after the Accession of the Country to the European Union
Identita a štátny záujem v slovenskej zahraničnej politike
Identity and State Interest in the Foreign Policy of Slovakia
ÚVAHY, ROZPRAVY, ROZHOVORY - REFLECTIONS, TRANSACTIONS, INTERVIEWS
Poland and Transatlantic Security
Poľsko a transatlantická bezpečnosť
Europe and America after Iraq – and Madrid
Európa a Amerika po udalostiach v Iraku – a v Madride
KONTAKTY – CONTACTS
Rozšírená Európa: Nová agenda
Towards a Wider Europe: The New Agenda
Parlamentné zhromaždenie NATO Bratislava 2004
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Session Bratislava 2004
RECENZIE, SPRÁVY – REVIEWS, REPORTS
92 Milan Zemko
Chmel, Rudolf: Moje slovenské pochybnosti
96 Alena Kotvanová
Divinský, Boris: Migration Trends in Selected EU Applicant Countries VOLUME V – Slovakia An Acceleration of Challenges for Society
101 Ingrid Brocková
Mrak, Mojmir – Rojec, Matija – Silva-Jáuregui, Carlos (eds.): Slovinsko. Z Juhoslávie do Európskej únie.
105 Balázs Jarábik
Antsipienka, Ales – Bulhakau, Valer (eds.): Belarus. Reform Scenarios.
Some of the Institutional Aspects of Integration of the Slovak Republic into the European Union
Attila Szép
Since signing of the membership agreement until
formal accession to the European Union, the Slovak Republic was in a position
of active observer in various committees, different commissions and
working groups, including almost all sessions of the EU institutions.
During this period, Slovak representatives were involved in a learning
process by participating in day-to-day work of the EU. From
institutional point of view, understanding of the decision making
process followed by creation of appropriate national mechanism was the
crucial task of mentioned period. This article is focused on analyses of
some basic principles of the decision making process on European affairs
in the Slovak Republic with the special attention on the particular role
of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.
Bodies of European Communities were created as executive institutions
and increasing role of national parliaments and the European Parliament
in decision making process is visible since the Maastricht Treaty only.
The protocol on the role of national parliaments and COSAC (Conference
of the European Affairs Committee created in 1989) attached to the
Amsterdam Treaty further strengthen the influence of national
legislative bodies to the European affairs. The Protocol defined which
documents should be passed to national parliaments for opinion.
Intergovernmental co-operation within EMU, CSFP and JHA is by definition
excluded from direct influence of national parliaments. Respective
member states created different co-ordination mechanism between a government
and a parliament. Today, executive power in different member states
does not share with legislative power the same volume of information.
Draft Protocol to the Constitutional Treaty on the role of national
parliaments shall ensure that every parliament will get same information
about European legislature in advance directly from EC.
Ability of a national parliament to influence the decision-making
process of the European Council by binding mandate for the government
remains a key difference between member states. Within the EU-15
three basic schemes could be identified.
1. policy-making – parliaments with a strong interference to the
decision taking process, by a right of veto and continuous
influence to the whole process of negotiations (e.g. Denmark, Austria)
2. policy influencing – parliaments with moderate interference to the
decision taking process by adoption of opinion, but without a right
of veto (e.g. United Kingdom, The Netherlands)
3. weak parliaments – parliaments without real interference to the
decision taking process, just information (e.g. Italy, Spain, Ireland).
Besides institutional and legal framework, also local political
traditions, internal policy balance and other factors are shaping
mechanism of co-operation between a government and a parliament
in European affairs. Strong legal competencies of the National Council
of the Slovak Republic per se do not guarantee their future efficient
use. Political parties themselves are playing important role. Austrian
experience showed that members of parliament were exercising direct
influence for the relatively short period. Actually they are using it
for control of the government and as an information channel.
Structure of the MFA and other governmental institutions ensuring
functioning of the Slovak Republic as an EU member state.
Currently existing decision-making mechanism in the Slovak Republic was
created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Legislative proposals from
the Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic in Brussels are
forwarded directly to respective ministries in Bratislava. At each
ministry a permanent working group was created, which represents
the first, lowest decision making level. Representatives of those
working groups use to meet weekly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at
regular meetings of the Commissions for EU affairs. Two Commissions for
EU affairs were constituted, by agenda copying EU structures of the
COREPER 1 and the COREPER 2. Both Commissions are preparing instructions
for Permanent Representation based on opinions of the respective
ministries and a framework position of the Slovak Republic.
Commissions themselves represent the second, medium decision making
level. For sessions of specific councils respective ministry is
preparing a special mandate in close co-operation with Commission 1
or 2 based on up-to-date development including results of COREPER
meetings. Draft of the mandate is approved by a responsible
minister and this is the third, high decision making level. According to
the described mechanism Slovakia could be portrayed as a country
with weak parliamentary control of the EU decision making process.
There are several reasons for this technocratic decision making
mechanism. The key reason is that Slovakia as a new coming country
should respect already established decision making process within the
EU. Therefore its structure in the Slovak Republic is basically copying
by hierarchy and rhythm of sessions the system of Working Groups-COREPER
1, 2-Ministerial Councils as it is functioning in the EC/EU. The leading
role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the whole process is some
kind of institutional inertia inherited from the period of pre-accession
negotiations. Political representatives, neither from executive power
nor from the parliament, are not directly involved in decision making
process on the first and the second level. Political influence is in
principles focused on ex ante and ex post control, without effective
management in line of decision making process.
Lack of parliamentary control in the decision making process was
principal part of the political debate in relation to the constitutional
amendments in the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Political
elite division in this question accords the government and the
opposition. Representatives of the Christian Democratic Movement and the
Hungarian Coalition Party together with some opposition representatives
are in favour of deeper involvement of the national parliament in the
decision making process in European affairs. There is a certain
“democratic deficit” in the decision making process. But
establishment of political parties in general do not possess necessary
skills and information about the EU to make an efficient and valuable
contribution. On side of the wider public a meaningful discussion
was missing too. Public debate was focused almost exclusively on drawing
from EU support funds and nomination on various political and
administrative posts within EC. However, the expert community in
Slovakia has an opportunity to influence national processes related to
the EU through the National Convention which continue to work.
It is apparent that discussions about the role of the National Council
of the Slovak Republic in the decision making process will continue.
Interest of political representations to the practical modalities of the
decision making process is a positive signal of continual maturity
of Slovak political elite in this particular field. However the Slovak
parliament actually does not have sufficient administrative and expert
capacities for efficient political influence to the decision making
process in European affairs.
International Migration in the Slovak Republic: Its Contemporary State and Expected Development after the Accession of the Country to the European Union
Boris Divinský
The Slovak Republic has become a Member State of the European
Union since May 1, 2004. This fact naturally brings about a multitude
of consequences, among others in the area of international migration. In
the presented contribution we attempt to evaluate not only international
migration in the Slovak Republic until its accession to the EU. Also we
try to provide some predictions of potential future trends and estimates
of impacts of international migration after the accession of Slovakia to
the EU for the short period to come.
When analysing the development of international migration in the Slovak
Republic, it is methodologically appropriate to differentiate the
migrants or foreigners in the country into three cardinal groups: the
undocumented (irregular, illegal) migrants, the asylum seekers and
refugees, and finally the aliens with a permit to stay in the
territory of Slovakia. However, it is necessary to accentuate that
reality is much more complex – other categories may be constituted by
the legal and illegal labour migrants, former migrants with permanent
residence in the country, de-facto refugees, displaced persons, persons
with the acquired Slovak citizenship, repatriates, voluntary returnees,
etc.
The development in the field of undocumented migration in the Slovak
Republic has been quite dramatic since 1993. Table 1 demonstrates the
absolute numbers of irregular migrants, namely in both directions – to
and from the country – till April 2004. Out of the figures shown it is
apparent that during the observed period Slovakia underwent several
stages; a radical turning point happened in 1998 and then from 2001
up to now. This dynamics reflects a general growth of migration in
the region of Central and Eastern Europe owing to the migration pressure
from more countries, particularly in Asia. It is worth mentioning the
following fact: the indicator of the absolute number, but mainly that of
the relative number of irregular migrants (i.e. the ratio of these
migrants to the number of all inhabitants in the country) for Slovakia
belongs to a group of the highest values within the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. It is evident that Slovakia represents a transit
territory for irregular migrants, unequivocally in the direction from
the east to the west (Table 2). The structure of countries of origin as
regards these migrants to the Slovak Republic has moderately been
modifying over recent years. In general, undocumented migration to
Slovakia is primarily of an economic character, i.e. it is made up by
voluntary economic migrants – mostly from South and East Asia (China,
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam), then from some
European regions (Russia – Chechnya, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia) as
well as certain African states. Nevertheless, it is also partly
motivated by political reasons – war events, conflicts, repressions or
any discrimination (at present Chechnya, previously Afghanistan, Iraq
etc.).
The asylum seekers and the refugees form the second fundamental group of
foreign migrants in the territory of Slovakia. The absolute number of
irregular migrants in the country has since 1993 increased roughly for 6
– 7 times, but the quantitative growth of asylum seekers was much more
remarkable within the given period. In 2003, their number exceeded the
limit of 10,000 persons yearly for the first time and thus rose almost
120 times against 1992 (Table 3). However, only a minimum number of
asylum applicants in Slovakia are granted asylum. This circumstance is
often a subject for criticism by non-governmental organisations,
international institutions and migrants themselves. Moreover, if the
ratio of the number of illegal migrants to the number of Slovak
inhabitants is practically the highest in the region of Central Europe,
it is absolutely contrariwise in the case of granted asylums. Among the
countries with the highest number of asylum seekers in Slovakia within a longer
period belong Afghanistan, India, China, Iraq, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Vietnam, and Somalia. The absolute numbers of asylum seekers from
Afghanistan and Iraq, however, markedly decreased recently, while the
number of applicants from Russia (more than 1/4 out of the total in
2003), Moldova, Armenia and Georgia intensely grows.
The quantitative development of aliens with a permit to stay in the
territory of the Slovak Republic has to a considerable degree a different
character than that of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. The
category of these foreigners existed here already during the communist
regime so they are not a new phenomenon in the country. Due to this
fact too the structure of countries of their origin is significantly
dissimilar. Among the 10 most represented countries of origin of such
aliens may naturally be found almost all neighbouring countries, having
intensive working and kin relations to Slovakia. The Czech Republic and
Ukraine dominate in number (Table 5). The next subgroups are constituted
by countries with a more numerous Slovak minority / Slavic nation
having immigration traditions (Romania, Yugoslavia, also Bulgaria,
Croatia), then by countries with historically formed communities in the
territory of Slovakia (Vietnam, Russia, lately China) and recently the
numbers of foreigners from some countries of the EU (Germany, Austria,
Italy, United Kingdom, France) and also the U.S.A. and others increase
too. But it is evident from Table 4 that, on the whole, after a certain
numerical growth of these migrants at the initial stage of independent
Slovakia we have been witnessing their stagnation since 1998. Currently
they represent around 0.55% of the total number of Slovak residents.
When drawing a possible trajectory of the development of
international migration to Slovakia following the country’s accession
to the EU, we have to take into consideration factors evoking and
influencing this migration. In addition, international migration is a highly
complex, heterogeneous, largely stochastic phenomenon. For this reason
it is extremely difficult to formulate any predictions of the
development of international migration on a territory; the lesser
area it is (as is the case of the Slovak Republic), the harder task it
is. Hitherto this topic has not been elaborated in Slovak scientific
literature. Therefore it is inevitable – at estimating a potential
future extent of international migration in the country – to start
from the broadest spectrum of contemporary as well as expected impacts
of various processes, phenomena, factors and mechanisms determining
migration shifts and flows on an international scale with an emphasis on
Slovakia.
Development of international migration, especially in the macro-region
of Europe, Asia, Africa. It seems that neuralgic points of endemic
violence will here be preserved (Chechnya, Caucasus, countries of Near
and Middle East, Sri Lanka, some states in sub-Saharan Africa) or
replaced by others (Central Asia, India-Pakistan, the Philippines,
Tai-wan, some countries in South Africa?) in the coming period. That is
why migration flows from these regions to Europe onto/through the
territory of the Slovak Republic as a result of political reasons
will probably continue to an unchanged degree. As regards international
migration for economic reasons, experts even forecast its growth towards
the EU in association with: the increasing demographic pressure in
mother countries, enhancing differences in the living standards, greater
possibilities to travel worldwide, flexible traffickers’ networks and
the like. On that account, we can legitimately believe that the number
of migrants from countries such as China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan;
from regions of South-East and Central Asia; from former countries of
the Soviet Union or from some poor countries of Africa will be on the
increase. Analogically, the extent of so-called environmental migration
is expected to rise as well.
Eastern border and the Schengen zone. The Slovak Republic has become a Member
State of the EU and through its eastern border forms also a part of
the outer limit of the EU. From 2007 Slovakia will be a full
component of the Schengen zone. However, some regulations of the
Schengen acquis had to be implemented before the country’s accession
to the EU, the others will have to be carried out till the end of 2006.
Already in 1999 the Slovak Government passed the Conception of service
of the border and alien police in the perspective of integrating the
Slovak Republic into the countries of the Schengen Agreement – the
protection of the outer limit of the EU. Then, in 2001 the Government
passed the Schengen action plan and in 2002 the Strategy of completing
the protection of the State border of Schengen type. With the help of
these measures, legal, personal, economic, material and technical
requirements have been partly ensured for the forthcoming period.
Current and future priorities thus are: to finish the model of
protecting the State border with the aim to eliminate undocumented
migration and criminal activities connected with it; to improve the
organisation of work through new forms and methods and by modern
technical means; to integrate Slovakia into the information systems to
detect and register illegal migrants, searched persons and counterfeit
documents. We can also partly suppose that the situation in the area of
co-operation between respective Slovak and Ukrainian authorities will be
improved within the attempts of Ukraine to be more associated with the
countries of the EU. It may be summarised that the number of irregular
migrants in the territory of Slovakia could modestly grow in the very
next period (10 – 15 thousand in 2004?). Nevertheless, it is
impossible to provide a more precise quantitative estimate of the
figure without a considerable potential error.
Asylum issues and the Dublin Convention. The situation in the field of
asylum migration in the Slovak Republic is marked with an extraordinary
dynamics and it is presumed that such a tendency will continue in
the future too. The number of asylum applications will be growing and
the importance of Slovakia as a destination country could be
noticeably enhanced right after the accession of the country to the EU.
An outlined trend in Table 3 referring to the first months of 2004
allows to forecast the final number of asylum seekers in Slovakia in
this year to 13 – 14 thousand persons. The Dublin Convention passed by
the Government will bring Slovakia an accrual of migrants too, this time
in the direction from the west. It is a consequence of the
Convention; the Member States of the EU will hand over to Slovakia all
irregular migrants entering the EU territory through the Slovak Republic
as well as all asylum seekers who applied for asylum in the Slovak
Republic but later left the country for the EU. Among other things, the
identification system EURODAC based on scanning fingerprints serves to
the effective implementation of the Dublin Convention. There are 35
workplaces of the border and alien police and some workplaces of
Migration office connected to this system in Slovakia. The reality of
first three weeks after launching the system proves its functionality;
out of some 650 scanned persons approximately three tens were “positive”.
Structural changes in view of aliens with a permit to stay. The
increase of their number is not much expected in the Slovak Republic in
the coming period. Reasons for such a stagnation are not
unequivocal. On the one hand, Slovakia after all does not represent an
especially attractive destination. Nor the communities of foreign
compatriots already established in the country are so numerous. It seems
that the accession of Slovakia to the EU will practically not much
change this situation. On the other hand, according to expressions of
aliens proper, the Slovak Republic does not signalise too high
willingness to grant permits to stay, particularly to foreigners from
economically less developed countries. Moreover, impacts of momentary
social and economic reforms realised now in Slovakia do not create a hospitable
climate for economically weaker entrepreneurs or employees from among
the aliens. As regards the structure of categories of permitted stays
and countries of origin of aliens, it is gradually changing. Since 2004
the citizens of the EU in the territory of the Slovak Republic have had
the right to permanent stay already. For this reason we can legitimately
count upon an increase in the number of those foreigners with permanent
stay in Slovakia who will come mainly from countries of Western Europe
and who will here carry out their high-skilled labour activities in the
tertiary and quaternary sectors. On the contrary, it is possible to
presume that the number of low-skilled workers coming from countries
outside the EU (e.g. the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Asia) – who were
previously more granted temporary or permanent stays – will drop. A part
of them will then logically join the group of illegally working and
staying persons in the territory of Slovakia so this category of
migrants will rise in number too.
New migration policy of the Slovak Republic. Slovakia is missing a newly
defined (and applied in practice) State migration policy reflecting not
only the contemporary situation, but primarily expected trends in the
field of international migration, namely in a broader geographical,
temporal and functional context. Such a migration policy should
refer to all spheres of international migration and should also:
comprise a more exact articulation of conditions for the employment
and enterprise of aliens on the Slovak labour market; reform the
integration policy for refugees; modify principles of granting the
Slovak citizenship; harmonize the visa policy; complete and revise
readmission agreements; promote a more intensive participation of
foreigners in domestic political, administrative and economic power and
civic life; accept a greater cultural diversity; change the
perception of migrants by the public opinion in Slovakia etc.
Only in this way it is possible to gradually mitigate a presumable
growth of undocumented migration to the territory of the Slovak Republic
and, on the contrary, to support those migrants who have interest in
life and work in the country in conformity with the possibilities and
legal standards of Slovakia and the European Union. In any case, however,
international migration is one of the immanent attributes of a globalising
world, to which the Slovak Republic belongs a bit more since May 1,
2004. Due to this fact, Slovak society will have to get used to the
increasing number of its members coming originally from abroad.
Identity and State Interest in the Foreign Policy of Slovakia
Jozef Bátora
The article invokes a set of social constructivist approaches to
the study of world politics and conceptualises Slovak foreign policy in
the light of identity formation. Central to the argument is the notion
that actions of states cannot be derived exclusively from state
interests (as realists in the IR theory would have it) but that
identities of states precede interests. As Wendt (1998:231) argues,
“[i]nterests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what
it wants until it knows who it is… [Yet] identities by themselves do
not explain action, since being is not the same thing as wanting…
Without interests identities have no motivational force, without
identities interests have no direction.” It is therefore crucial for a state
(or any other actor) to have an identity so as to be able to act in a meaningful
way. Establishing an identity is dependent upon an actors’
self-understanding and on the recognition of this self-understanding as
valid by other actors with whom s/he interacts. Identity therefore is
reflexive. The ability to bestow a certain identity upon us rests
with those actors who already are what we are striving to become.
Ringmar (1996:81) calls these audiences the circles of recognition.
Facing problems with receiving recognition of a particular
self-understanding, we have three options (ibid., p. 82). We can accept
others’ descriptions of ourselves; we can try to modify our
self-understanding and describe ourselves anew; or we can stand by our
original self-understanding and try to convince the circles of
recognition that it is valid. If we choose the last option, words most
likely will not suffice, and what we instead do is to act. Such
“action does not seek to maximise utility or minimise loss, but
instead to establish a standard – a self – by which
utilities and losses can be measured. These are consequently not
‘rational actions’, but instead actions undertaken in order to make
rational actions possible. We act, as it were, in ‘self defence’ in
the most basic sense of the word – in defence of the applicability of
our descriptions of our selves” (ibid., p. 83).
New states upon their entrance into the international system strive for
recognition and for the development of a particular identity.
Slovakia was no exception. The first five years of Slovakia’s
independence were characterised by an unclear identity of the state.
There was a discrepancy between the self-descriptions of Slovakia
as a country ready to enter the EU and NATO presented by the
government of the Prime Minister Mečiar and the negative descriptions
of Slovakia in the circles of recognition in the EU and NATO reflecting
the semi-authoritarian political style of the very same Slovak Prime
Minister. The new government that came to power following the election
in 1998 had tried to overcome the negative descriptions of Slovakia in
the circles of recognition of the EU and NATO through action. A primary
example of such actions was for instance the decision to open the Slovak
air-space to NATO forces during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Similarly,
adoption of structures in the EU pre-accession process reflected the
same dynamics of recognition-seeking. In general, a focus on
aspects of identity enables us to see the interconnectedness between
domestic politics and foreign policies, as the character of domestic
political processes largely defines the identity of the state, which in
turn defines state interests and actions in foreign policy.
When it comes to practical implications of the identity-focus for the
conduct of Slovak foreign policy, there are at least two areas in which
this is relevant. First, in the work of Slovak diplomatic missions
abroad. Given instant access to information on events abroad through the
media, the value added by Slovak diplomats should be their deep
understanding of local cultures and identities of foreign constituencies,
which the Slovak government and public cannot perceive from their
Central-European perspective. The thrust of the information function of
Slovak embassies should therefore be moving from the simple information
gathering and reporting towards editing and interpretation of events
abroad. The Slovak diplomats should become interpreters of events
instead of simply reporters on events.
Secondly, the focus on identity issues will have impact on the
strategies of public diplomacy. The building blocks of such strategies
will be consistent narratives locating Slovakia in time and space, and
outlining its specifics and values. Presentation of the narratives would
be supported by a set of metaphors capturing the essentials of the
narratives. The goal will be to achieve a situation, where the term
‘Slovakia’ will be associated with positive values by foreign
audiences. A nuanced approach and co-ordination are necessary due
to the fact that different segments of Slovak engagement abroad will be
helped by different kinds of narratives and metaphors. Legitimisation of
public diplomacy narratives is also crucial as they in turn will shape
the identity of the Slovak constituency.
To sum up, analysing Slovak foreign policy through the lens of identity
allows for at least three propositions. First, given its membership in
the EU and NATO, Slovakia anno 2004 has different identity and thereby
different interests than Slovakia anno 1993. This has implications for
the character of Slovakia’s relations with the EU and NATO member
states and with third states. Secondly, given the stabilisation of
Slovakia’s belonging in terms of foreign affairs, the aspects of
identity will become increasingly “invisible” and interests will
increasingly seem the primary determinants of Slovakia’s foreign
policy actions. Thirdly, Slovakia’s membership in the EU and NATO
means that Slovakia now starts to play a role as a member of
the circles of recognition for those countries in Southern and Eastern
Europe and the adjacent regions, which strive for membership or
intensification of relations with the EU and NATO. This means that
Slovakia now can use this position for awarding recognition to those
policies of the countries in question that are coherent with Slovak
values and foreign policy priorities. Recognition, in other words, is a powerful
foreign policy tool.
Poľsko a transatlantická bezpečnosť
Marcin Zaborowski a Kerry Longhurst
Marcin Zaborowski, Centre for International Relations, a Kerry
Longhurst, European Research Institute na University of Birmingham sa vo
svojom príspevku, ktorý je napísaný na základe ich článku
uverejneného v októbrovom čísle International Affairs, zamerali
na poľský transatlanticizmus.
Poľsko sa od začiatku 90. rokov javí ako jeden z najbližších
spojencov Spojených štátov v strednej a východnej Európe.
Najmä po udalostiach v septembri 2001 sa Poľsko ukázalo byť
Spojeným štátom bližšie ako ktorýkoľvek z ich západoeurópskych
spojencov. Dá sa teda povedať, že zatiaľ čo udalosti po 11.
septembri spôsobili „vylúčenie“ Paríža a Berlína z úzkeho
okruhu blízkych amerických spojencov, Poľsko túto medzeru promptne
vyplnilo.
Spojené štáty vnímajú Poľsko, aj v dôsledku jeho populácie
a geografickej polohy, ako dôležitého hráča v NATO a následne
po jeho prijatí do EÚ sa očakáva, že jeho úloha regionálnej
mocnosti bude ešte výraznejšia. Aj v dôsledku rozkolu, ktorý
nastal v EÚ počas irackej krízy, a ktorý poukázal na
relatívne slabú víziu Nemecka a Francúzka o úlohe Európy
vo svete, sa môžeme domnievať, že Poľsko bude pravdepodobne patriť
ku skupine štátov, ktoré budú v blízkej budúcnosti
formovať novú Európu a jej zahraničnú politiku.
Príčiny blízkeho vzťahu Poľska a USA sú výhradne strategické.
Poľsko vníma americkú prítomnosť v Európe ako záruku svojej
územnej bezpečnosti a pre USA je Poľsko spriateleným štátom
na strategickej hranici západnej a východnej Európy. Ako
spomenul americký veľvyslanec v Poľsku Ch. R. Hill: „Poliaci a Američania
majú vo všeobecnosti spoločný pohľad na bezpečnostnú a zahraničnú
politiku, čo je dôsledkom našich konkrétnych historických skúseností.“
Poľské elity sú podobne ako tie americké skeptické aj čo sa týka
multilateralizmu. Mali rovnaký pohľad aj na situáciu v Iraku,
argumentujúc, že pre vojenský zásah v Iraku nebola rezolúcia
OSN potrebná. Pôvod tejto zhody má samozrejme rozličné korene. Kým
v USA tento postoj vyplýval z ich sily, v prípade Poľska
bol založený na jeho relatívnej slabosti. Autori to vysvetľujú cez
prizmu teórie R. Kagana, ktorý argumentuje tým, že zatiaľ čo Európa
potrebuje multilaterálne inštitúcie, aby tak kompenzovala svoju relatívnu
slabosť, USA vďaka svojmu oveľa väčšiemu armádnemu potenciálu vnímajú
multilaterálne organizácie skôr ako obmedzujúce než umožňujúce zásah.
S tým však nekorešponduje správanie sa stredo- a východoeurópskych
krajín. Kagan pri koncipovaní tejto teórie pravdepodobne nevzal do úvahy
skutočnosť, že v Európe existuje názorová diverzita. Namiesto
toho, to, čo poňal ako Európu, je iba vykreslenie nemeckého a francúzskeho
postoja. Jeho teória sa teda neviaže na Európu ako celok.
Vôbec nie je prekvapujúce, že Poľsko, podobne ako aj ďalšie
postkomunistické štáty, podporilo americký postoj voči Iraku. Okrem
toho, že mali možno rovnaké motívy ako niektoré západoeurópske
krajiny (teda že nesúhlasia s nemeckým a francúzskym pohľadom
na svet), ich podnety sú pre región špecifické a potrebujú ďalšie
prepracovanie. Kaganova dichotómia americkej sily a európskej
slabosti sa dá použiť v tom prípade, ak bude zrejmé, že poľský
atlanticizmus, rovnako ako atlanticizmus ostatných postkomunistických
štátov, je výsledkom ich „slabosti“. Slabosť tohto regiónu vyplýva
najmä z geopolitickej zraniteľnosti a nedávnej minulosti,
keď tieto štáty patrili do tzv. sovietskeho bloku. Na rozdiel od západoeurópskych
štátov, Poliaci a podobne aj ostatné stredo- a východoeurópske
krajiny nechcú obmedzovať americkú hegemóniu. V skutočnosti má
Varšava záujem na tom, aby USA boli v Európe prítomné a presadzovali
svoju politiku. Keďže Poliaci sa zmierili s faktom, že nie sú
sami schopní zabezpečiť svoju bezpečnosť, akceptujú hegemonický
medzinárodný systém. Avšak len v tom prípade, pokiaľ nie je
hegemón ich bezprostredným susedom. Ako autori tvrdia, je zrejmé, že
americká sila je živým dôkazom neefektívnosti Európy ako celku v otázkach
kolektívnej bezpečnosti, alebo ako tvrdí Kagan, aktuálneho úpadku.
Naopak fakt, že Poliaci sa stali akýmsi protežantom USA pre nich
znamená ozdravenie ich bezpečnosti, resp. ich všeobecného statusu.
Aby sme tieto rozdiely v Európe pochopili, je nutné rozumieť
podstate poľského strategického vývoja. Po prvé, poloha medzi
Nemeckom a Sovietskym zväzom, resp. Ruskom, bola v minulosti
zdrojom ohrození poľskej štátnosti. Aj v dôsledku tejto skutočnosti
ostáva poľská bezpečnostná politika primárne koncentrovaná na otázku
teritoriálnej obrany. Nie je preto prekvapujúce, že Poľsko silne
podporuje NATO, vedené USA, ktoré je schopné reagovať na základe článku
5. Aj poľská východná politika je poznačená historickou skúsenosťou,
a preto sa niekedy javí úplne inak ako východná politika západoeurópskych
štátov. Je charakterizovaná najmä silnou podporou novovzniknutým štátom
medzi Poľskom a Ruskom, Ukrajine, demokratizačným pohybom v Bielorusku
a rozšíreniu NATO za jeho východnú hranicu. Po druhé, poľská
aktívna účasť v operáciách, v ktorých je ohrozená
stabilita určitého regiónu, vyplýva z pretrvávajúcich
aspektov poľskej identity – boli obeťami západoeurópskeho
pacifizmu. Ide najmä o politiku appeasementu Francúzska a Veľkej
Británie voči Hitlerovi. Po tretie je to ambivalentný postoj voči
multilaterálnym bezpečnostným organizáciám (s výnimkou NATO).
Tento postoj opäť vyplýva z historickej skúsenosti. Poliaci sú
silne kritický najmä voči Spoločenstvu národov, ktoré nebolo
schopné zabrániť druhej svetovej vojne. OSN má síce v Poľsku
lepšiu reputáciu, no tej zas vyčítajú, že nebola schopná zabrániť
vzniku studenej vojny a nechala tak Poľsko na „zlej“ strane železnej
opony.
Aj keď je transatlantická komunita v súčasnosti širšia, je
takisto viac vnútorne rozdelená. Takéto rozdrobenie sa však nehodí
do Kaganovej teórie, podľa ktorej je Európa na jednej strane a USA
na druhej. Ide skôr o vnútornú rozdrobenosť samotnej Európy,
ktorú americký minister obrany rozdelil na novú a starú. V tomto
ponímaní patrí Poľsko určite do Rumsfedlovej novej Európy. Táto
skutočnosť bola potvrdená podpísaním tzv. listu ôsmich stredo- a východoeurópskych
predsedov vlád, ktorým podporili zásah v Iraku. Zatiaľ čo západoeurópske
mocnosti, ktoré zásah podporili, k tomu viedli obavy z irackého
ohrozenia svetovej bezpečnosti, pre Poľsko to bol sekundárny faktor.
Postoj Varšavy k irackej kríze, spolu s ambivalentným
postojom voči EBOP a jej jasná podpora americkému raketovému
obrannému programu boli jednoznačne v súlade s kľúčovou
dogmou poľskej zahraničnej politiky – snaha o pokračovanie
angažovanosti USA v Európe. Len čas ukáže, či sa po vstupe Poľska
do EÚ niečo zmení, ale podľa autorov existujú minimálne tri dôvody,
pre ktoré nebude poľský transatlanticizmus ohrozený. Po prvé, poľská
východná hranica ostáva východnou hranicou EÚ. Ak vezmeme do úvahy
teritoriálnu bezpečnosť, ktorú, ako už bolo spomenuté, Poľsko vníma
ako kľúčovú, ostane NATO pre Poľsko naďalej kľúčovou bezpečnostnou
garanciou. Po druhé, EÚ je v otázkach zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej
politiky aj naďalej rozdelená. A po tretie, rola, ktorú zohrali
USA pri skončení studenej vojny, ako aj podpora demokratizácie v Poľsku,
je pre Poľsko stále nenahraditeľná.
Ak to teda nebude členstvo v EÚ, čo podkope poľský
transatlanticizmus a jeho nesporne kladný vzťah k NATO, môže
to byť iba nezvládnutie svojej regionálnej úlohy a neschopnosť
modernizovať svoje ozbrojené sily, pretože v dôsledku vstupu
nových členov stráca Poľsko svoj status nováčika a je vnímane
rovnako ako staré členské štáty. Ak teda Poľsko zlyhá v týchto
úlohách, môže sa štruktúra jeho vzťahov s USA zmeniť.
Európa a Amerika po udalostiach v Iraku – a v Madride
Jeff Gedmin
Jeff Gedmin, riaditeľ Aspen Institute v Berlíne, sa vo svojom
príspevku, ktorý predniesol na podujatí Inštitútu pre verejné otázky
v rámci projektu Politickí aktéri a budúcnosť
transatlantických vzťahov, zameral hlavne na objasnenie dvoch pre neho
dôležitých bodov. Prvým je vzťah Ameriky a Európy, za zlomový
bod ktorého považuje 10. november 1989, deň, kedy definitívne padol
Berlínsky múr. Táto udalosť predstavovala podľa Gedmina začiatok
konca komunizmu, začiatok európskeho unifikačného procesu, ale najmä
to bol dátum, po ktorom Európa zistila, že vzťah, ktorý mala
dovtedy so Spojenými štátmi, je odrazu iný, a že závislosť
od USA, ktorú pociťovala počas studenej vojny – obdobia spolupráce,
súčinnosti, ako aj konfrontácie – sa kvalitatívne zmenila. Zmenila
sa zo dňa na deň. Oba kontinenty boli nútené svoju reláciu
prehodnotiť. Ak sa obzrieme späť do obdobia ostatných 15 rokov, môžeme
vo vzťahu Amerika – Európa spozorovať niečo svieže, normálne a racionálne.
Je to práve dôsledok prehodnotenia vzájomných vzťahov. V súvislosti
s diskurzom prebiehajúcim v dôsledku irackej krízy cituje
autor nemeckého ministra zahraničných vecí Joshku Fishera, ktorý
povedal, že celá táto debata by mohla byť najmä o tom, v akom
svete chceme žiť. Ako tvrdí autor, bolo to presne o tom, aké inštitúcie,
pravidlá, vyššie záujmy a priority budeme mať. Čo však
autorovi vo vyjadrení chýba, je jadro celého tohto vzťahu, a tým
je moc. Podľa autora sa to týka najmä moci, úcty, dôvery, rovnosti.
Je to veľmi komplikované vzhľadom na skutočnosť, že nie všetci
Európania zmýšľajú rovnako. Európa totiž dnes nie je tou Európou
studenej vojny, ktorá bola vedená Berlínom, Bruselom či Parížom.
Dnes je to Európa, ktorá sa 10. novembra prebudila a povedala si,
že USA už tak veľmi nepotrebuje a chcela by si s nimi
vybudovať nový vzťah. Ako tvrdí autor, USA pravdepodobne podcenili
skutočnosť, že počas 40 rokov trvajúcej studenej vojny bolo pre západnú
Európu veľmi ťažké prehltnúť fakt, že je menejcenným partnerom
USA a že v kľúčových momentoch musí stáť pri nich. Ešte
ťažšie to bolo možno pre Nemecko, ktoré bolo rozdelené, nebolo stálym
členom Bezpečnostnej rady OSN, nemalo jadrové zbrane ani vlastnú nezávislú
zahraničnú politiku. Keďže to Nemecko malo počas tohto obdobia ťažšie,
možno to v súčasnosti dáva pocítiť USA.
Druhým a nemenej významným bodom je 11. september 2001. Autor súhlasí
s vyjadrením, že 11. september bol útokom na demokraciu, civilizáciu,
liberalizmus a mravnosť, ale podľa jeho názoru išlo predovšetkým
o účelový, zámerný útok na Spojené štáty americké, hoci
si uvedomuje, že USA neboli jediné, ktoré boli ohrozené. Neboli to
len občania USA, ktorí zahynuli, boli to aj Európania a
teroristi odvtedy zabili ďalších, ale existujú určité príčiny,
pre ktoré sa autor domnieva, že útoky boli namierené predovšetkým
proti USA, nie výhradne, ale predovšetkým. Možno práve preto teraz
nastal čas, aby si aj Amerika povedala, že síce Európu potrebuje,
ale trochu menej ako v období studenej vojny. Spojené štáty išli
do vojny proti Iraku a mnohí im vyčítali, že to urobili
unilaterálne. Jeff Gedmin však tvrdí, že nie. Urobili to bez Nemecka
a bez Francúzska, ale aj keď mali vytvoriť širšiu koalíciu,
stále mali podporu Austrálie, Južnej Kórey, Japonska, Španielska,
Poľska a ďalších stredoeurópskych krajín, Dánska a Veľkej
Británie. Aj keď to teraz vyznieva inak, z pohľadu Američanov
predstavoval 11. september objektívny dôvod na zmenu kvality diskurzu
a postoja voči Európe. Je to aj preto, že americkí stratégovia,
vnímajúc problémy v Indii, Pakistane, Kórei, Číne atď. považujú
práve tieto oblasti za zóny potenciálneho ohrozenia. Práve kvôli
tomuto začali vnímať Európu odlišne, a ako tvrdí autor,
pravdepodobne to bude v najbližších rokoch pokračovať.
Na záver svojho príspevku sa Gedmin vyjadruje k situácii v Madride.
Podľa neho sa len v najbližších rokoch ukáže, či skúsenosti
z Madridu budú tým, čo zblíži Európu s USA v boji
proti terorizmu, alebo či sa ich cesty rozídu. Autor považuje postoj
španielskej vlády za úplne normálny. Ako však pripomína,
vyjadrenia nového predsedu vlády sa zhodujú s cieľmi Al-Káidy
zatriasť koalíciou. Práve toto narúša koalíciu v Iraku a prehliada
dôležitosť a potrebu chápať tento problém nielen ako otázku
uplatňovania zákonov, ale aj ako problém zahraničnej politiky –
zahraničnej politiky, ktorá používa množstvo nástrojov, vrátane
vojenskej intervencie a použitia sily.
Čo sa týka Iraku, táto situácia nechala množstvo otvorených otázok
a problémov, ale sústredených výhradne v Iraku, pretože
podľa autora mali USA dobrých Európanov, ktorí ich podporili, a rovnako
dobrých Európanov, ktorí ich nepodporili. Vojna sa však skončila a v
súčasnosti čelíme iným výzvam, keďže v Iraku zostali dve
diferencované skupiny, ktoré majú spoločný cieľ – rozvrátiť
koalíciu a vyhnať USA z Iraku, zabrániť rozvoju bezpečnosti
a stability a vytvoreniu irackej vlády.
Je samozrejmé, že zmeny v regiónoch napätia sa neuskutočnia zo
dňa na deň. Je potrebné prísť na skutočné korene a pohnútky
radikálnych islamistov. Je to dlhodobý proces a za taký je nutné
ho aj považovať. Ak si však hlbšie neuvedomíme príčiny, ktoré
sme si uvedomovali počas 40 rokov v strednej a východnej Európe
– boj za slobodu, sebaurčenie, politický pluralizmus –
pravdepodobne v najbližších dekádach nedosiahneme žiaden výrazný
pokrok v riešení problému radikálneho islamizmu.
Towards a Wider Europe: The New Agenda
Pavol Demeš, Mário Nicolini
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, in co-operation with
the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Institute of Public
Affairs (Slovakia), convened an international conference entitled
Towards a Wider Europe: The New Agenda. The meeting took place on
18 March 2004 in Bratislava, Slovakia, prior to a parallel
conference of some ten Central and East European Prime Ministers, two
Presidents from the Southern Caucasus as well as NATO Secretary General
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the EU Commissioner Guenter Verheugen.
Coming several weeks before the official accession of Central and
Eastern Europe to the European Union and NATO, this was one of the first
major international conferences to focus attention on defining a new
agenda for the Euro-Atlantic community toward wider Europe. This
conference brought together over hundred high-level experts and
representatives of policy think tanks from more than twenty countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, both those to join the EU and NATO this year
and those representing the immediate Southern and Eastern neighbourhood
of the enlarging Euro-Atlantic community. Leading experts from the
United States and Western Europe, as well as relevant international
organisations, joined the discussions.
In helping to identify crucial challenges for the years to come, this
conference aimed to help set an agenda for foreign and security policy
for the countries in the region, as well as of the Euro-Atlantic
community more broadly. With the dual enlargement of the EU and NATO
this year, a major part of Central and Eastern Europe will become
formally and firmly anchored in the main structures of European and
transatlantic integration. The achievement of membership will shift the
foreign and security policy agenda of accession countries, as well as of
both organisations more broadly, increasingly towards new geographical
and problem areas. These significant challenges were central to this
conference.
Panel I – Wider Europe: Both the EU and NATO need to define and
develop their relationship with Europe’s Eastern and Southern
neighbourhood. To date, various forms of partnerships have been
established. Beyond that, the Wider Europe paper proposed by the EU
outlines a new and comprehensive framework. The first panel
discussed areas of co-operation with the countries acceding to,
negotiating with, and remaining outside the European Union and NATO.
Panel II – Integrating the Balkans: The Balkan countries, their
political and economic reform processes, and their eventual integration
into Euro-Atlantic structures remain one of the primary challenges in
the immediate neighbourhood of an enlarged NATO and the EU. The second
panel addressed current and possible future approaches that can assist
the Balkans in accomplishing the dual goal of internal reform and
external integration.
Panel III – Security in the Black Sea Region: The Black Sea region
bridges the space between the realm encompassed by Euro-Atlantic
structures and the Greater Middle East with its manifold and complex
challenges for security and democracy in the world. For this reason,
increasing attention is geared towards developing a comprehensive
security strategy for the Black Sea region. The third panel focused on
recent efforts and possible approaches in this area.
Panel IV – Challenges to Democracy and Security: The Wider Europe
framework, the reform and integration process in the Balkans, and
security issues arising around the Black Sea describe three of the most
salient challenges for security and democracy. Others will certainly
have to be added, not least in the Greater Middle East and in other
regions of the world where freedom, democracy and security still face
uncertain prospects.
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Session Bratislava 2004
Jozef Banáš
At the beginning of this article it is necessary to stress that the
basis of the Parliamentary Assembly work depends on activities of 5
Committees and 9 Sub-Committees. During the Session in Bratislava the
reports on development of Caucasus as well as fight against the children
trafficking in Europe were discussed within the Committee on the Civil
Dimension of Security. The transatlantic co-operation and fight against
terrorism in Afghanistan, European Security and Defence Policy, NATO
Response Force, the role of Europe in the process of stabilisation of
the Balkans as well as implementation of the Prague commitments were the
main topics of the session of the Defence and Security Committee. The
discussion within Committee on Economics and Security concentrated on
post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan, economic transition in Central
and Eastern Europe and its influence on environment. The debate within
the Political Committee focused on the dominant topic of the Session –
NATO and the use of force, the EU – NATO relations, further
development in the Western Balkans, transatlantic relation and security
conception of the EU. The Science and Technology Committee discussed the
issue of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile defence
system and weapons in space. Transatlantic relation was the official
topic of three Committees. The key discussion in this regard focused on
the further development in Iraq. The aspects of further political,
security and military development in this country were also analysed.
The report of the reporter Jos van Gennip dealt with the post-war
reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Another topic of the session concerned the issue of NATO and the use of
force. The main goal of the Bert Koenders report was to initiate a discussion
within the NATO member states on who authorises military force and under
which conditions.
The Western Balkans was also the intensively discussed issue during the
Session. The reporter stressed the need for closer NATO, EU and other
stakeholders co-operation for stabilisation.
Relations of NATO, Russia and Ukraine, co-operation in the Mediterranean
region and the Caucasus were debated as well. The significant issue
being discussed was the relation between NATO and the EU, especially
relations of the Response Force of both organisations.
Significance of the Bratislava Session is based on the fact that it was
held short before the NATO Summit in Istanbul. As for Slovakia, it was
very important that Slovakia’s representatives had the opportunity to
present their opinions concerning the current Alliance’s questions, as
well as the problems in Slovakia. Chairman of the National Council of
the Slovak Republic Pavol Hrušovský, the Prime Minister Mikuláš
Dzurinda, the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška,
the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak
Republic Ivan Korčok, as well as the deputies of the National Council
of the Slovak Republic Tibor Mikuš and László Nagy held presentations
at the Session. As the Parliamentary Assembly Deputies claimed, the
supreme constitutional officials expressed clear pro-Atlantic attitude
and confirmed the decision to contribute to the strengthening of the
Alliance.
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